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FRAUDULENTLY  INDUCED  CONFESSIONS
Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer*
The jurisprudence on the use of police deception during interrogations is singularly
unhelpful.  Police may deceive in order to induce a suspect to confess, the courts tell us, unless
they go too far.  Police are permitted, for example, to feign sympathy for the suspect, lie about the
existence of incriminating evidence, and falsely downplay the seriousness of the offense under
investigation.  But when police engage in other forms of deception, such as by offering false
promises of leniency or misrepresenting the suspect’s Miranda rights, courts will balk and declare
the resulting confession coerced.  Yet neither courts nor commentators have successfully articu-
lated why exactly the line is drawn where it is.  Nor have they been able to prescribe how far the
police may go with respect to other types of deception, such as misrepresentation of facts extrane-
ous to the interrogation room, before they cross the line.
Part of the reason is semantic.  In other areas, the law distinguishes between coercion and
deception.  Coercion is generally thought of as depriving the actor of free will or, to put it more
helpfully, putting the actor to an unfair choice of undesirable alternatives.  But deception is
different.  Deception alters the actor’s perception of her choices so that, while she perceives herself
to be making a rational choice of the more attractive alternative, a rational actor would have
decided differently if she were aware of the true facts.  That is to say, while the person under
duress is not acting of her own free will, the deceived person is exercising her free will to make a
choice that is apparently, but not actually, in her best interests.
Thus, police deception is rarely coercive in the true sense of the word.  During interrogation,
the suspect’s reaction to questioning can be seen as a continuous set of decisions on her part as to
whether exercise or forgo the right to remain silent.  When police lie about the strength of the
evidence against the suspect or falsely promise leniency, the suspect still exercises free will to weigh
the costs and the benefits of standing by the right to remain silent and to make a reasoned choice
between exercising or forgoing that right.  Police deception manipulates that choice by altering the
perceived costs and benefits of standing by the right to remain silent, but it does so within a
framework in which the suspect exercises free will.  Thus, most police deception is noncoercive.
Police deception is truly coercive only where, if the false information were true, the suspect would
be deprived of the ability to make a fair choice, as where the police point an unloaded gun at the
suspect’s head.
The problem with most police deception is not that it is potentially coercive but that it is
potentially fraudulent.  And the key to evaluating noncoercive police deception is materiality, an
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element of fraud across many different contexts.  A confession induced by noncoercive police
deception should be suppressed if the deception relates to a fact material to the suspect’s decision to
confess.  Such a fact is material if, but only if, a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would
have attached importance to the fact in deciding whether to exercise or forgo the right to remain
silent.
This standard explains much of the caselaw in this area.  While it might be common for
police deception to induce confessions, it is rare that the deception would have caused a reasona-
ble person, particularly one having just been informed of her rights, to speak.  Only when, given
the deception, a reasonable person aware of her rights would have chosen to forgo the right to
remain silent and instead speak can we say that the confession was fraudulently induced and
should be suppressed.
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INTRODUCTION
When evaluating claims that a confession has been coerced, courts
employ a “totality of the circumstances” standard1 under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2  Yet, today, a good many police inter-
rogation tactics involve deception, including deception about the existence
of incriminating evidence, deception about the adversarial role of the police,
even deception about whether an official interrogation is taking place.
Indeed, deception has largely replaced coercion as the key issue regarding
the legality of custodial interrogation tactics.3  One might say that deception
is the new coercion.  Yet, faced with claims that inducement of a confession
through deception is constitutionally impermissible, courts generally fall
back on the same due process standard they have used to determine whether
certain tactics are coercive.  Under this standard, courts rarely find deception
to be impermissible, but they are unable or unwilling to articulate a useable
standard for when police deception goes too far.
But deception is not coercion.  The rhetoric of classic interrogation
jurisprudence, with its emphasis on the “overborne will,” is an ill fit for cases
involving deception.  Every other area of the law recognizes that deception is
different from coercion.  Coercion is thought to occur when another person
deprives an actor of the free will to make a rational choice—that is, when it
leaves the actor with an unfair choice between unattractive alternatives.
Deception, by contrast, causes a person to exercise free will to make a seem-
ingly rational choice based on false information, absent which the choice
would have been different.  Most deceptive police practices fall within the
rubric of fraud.  Far from being instances where the suspect was deprived of
the free will to admit, deny, or refuse to answer, in most cases involving
police deception, the suspect appears to have made a calculated decision, to
have exercised free will, to confess in exchange for some perceived benefit.
Only where statements by the police would be coercive irrespective of their
truth or falsity can we say that the suspect has been coerced.  But where a
person makes a seemingly rational decision to provide information based on
an illusory promise of a benefit, and a reasonable person in the situation
would have done the same, we should call it fraud.
This view of deceptive interrogation practices is fortified by the Supreme
Court’s current approach to waiver of Miranda rights.  Although the Court
1 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434 (2000) (quoting Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973)) (“The due process test [for coercive interroga-
tions] takes into consideration ‘the totality of all the surrounding circumstances—both the
characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.’”).
2 “No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  This provision was first interpreted to bar
coercive interrogation tactics in Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285–86 (1936).
3 See Richard A. Leo, From Coercion to Deception: The Changing Nature of Police Interroga-
tion in America, 18 CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE 35, 37 (1992) (“Psychological deception has
replaced physical coercion as one of the most salient, defining features of contemporary
police interrogation.”).
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has had a permissive attitude toward deception during the interrogation
itself, the Miranda Court specifically condemned deception meant to trick a
person into waiving her rights.  But the Court has recently effected a subtle
shift in its Miranda jurisprudence that posits waiver as a continuing process
rather than a singular event.  That is to say, every time a suspect in custodial
interrogation who has been read her Miranda rights answers a question, she
implicitly decides to waive4 those rights rather than invoke or exercise them.5
This view of waiver dovetails neatly with the view of police deception as
potentially fraudulent rather than coercive; rather than depriving her of free
will, police deception alters the internal cost-benefit analysis the suspect must
make in order to decide whether to speak.  Police deception is improper
when it falsely skews the relative costs and benefits of speaking so that the
suspect is fooled into forgoing rather than invoking or exercising her right to
remain silent, and where a reasonable person under the circumstances would
have come to the same conclusion.
This Article argues that, putting to one side police statements that would
be coercive irrespective of their truth or falsity, police deception during
interrogation is constitutionally intolerable if, but only if (1) it causes the
suspect to falsely believe that the benefits of speaking outweigh its costs, and
(2) a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would have the same belief.
The Article first and foremost seeks to explain current law.  Examination of
police deception cases reveals that courts generally follow the principle stated
above even if they use the wrong terminology.  The Article also argues that
this principle makes the most sense given the evolution of Miranda doctrine
that has grown up around the jurisprudence of coerced confessions.6
4 It might seem odd to speak of “implicit waiver,” given that the Court has told us that
we cannot “presume a waiver of . . . important federal rights from a silent record.”  Boykin
v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969).  Outside the Miranda context, the Court has
acknowledged “that an individual may lose the benefit of the privilege without making a
knowing and intelligent waiver,” and suggested that “the term ‘waiver’” should be reserved
for those cases in which “one affirmatively renounces the protection of the privilege.”  Gar-
ner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 654 n.9 (1976); see Lawrence Rosenthal, Compulsion, 19
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 889, 928 (2017).  Thus, it would be more accurate to say that a suspect
who responds to police questioning but does not make an affirmative renunciation merely
“forgoes” her rights rather than “waives” them.  Nevertheless, in the Miranda context, the
Court continues to equate forbearance with waiver. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S.
370, 388–89 (2010) (suspect who is made aware of his Miranda rights waives them by
answering questions); infra subsection III.A.2.  Therefore, this Article uses the terms
“waive” and “forgo” interchangeably.
5 This Article adopts the implicit distinction the Court has drawn between the invoca-
tion of the right to remain silent and its exercise.  A suspect invokes that right when she
unequivocally tells police that she will not speak, Thompkins, 560 U.S. at 381–82, or that she
will not speak without a lawyer present, Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994).
An invocation requires the police to stop interrogating, at least temporarily.  By contrast, a
suspect exercises the right to remain silent simply by remaining silent, and police may
continue the interrogation.
6 This Article is certainly not the first to address deceptive interrogation practices by
the police.  It is, however, among a very few that attempt to explain current law. See, e.g.,
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Thus, this Article’s contribution to the existing literature is threefold.
First, it recharacterizes police deception cases as falling outside of the frame-
work of coercion and instead treats police deception as a variety of fraud.
Second, it offers a concise explanation for much of existing law on police
deception.  Finally, it defends current law on police deception as consistent
Christopher Slobogin, Manipulation of Suspects and Unrecorded Questioning: After Fifty Years of
Miranda Jurisprudence, Still Two (or Maybe Three) Burning Issues, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1157, 1157
(2017); William J. Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 VA. L. REV. 761, 803
(1989).
For articles advocating a more extensive or even complete constitutional ban on
police deception during interrogation, see Albert W. Alschuler, Constraint and Confession,
74 DENV. U. L. REV. 957, 967–78 (1997); Miriam S. Gohara, A Lie for a Lie: False Confessions
and the Case for Reconsidering the Legality of Deceptive Interrogation Techniques, 33 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 791, 794–95 (2006); Gary Hamblet, Note, Deceptive Interrogation Techniques and the
Relinquishment of Constitutional Rights, 10 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 109, 111–12 (1978); Dorothy
Heyl, The Limits of Deception: An End to the Use of Lies and Trickery in Custodial Interrogations to
Elicit the “Truth”?, 77 ALB. L. REV. 931, 932–33 (2013); Amelia Courtney Hritz, Note, “Volun-
tariness with a Vengeance”: The Coerciveness of Police Lies in Interrogations, 102 CORNELL L. REV.
487, 489 (2017); Sean Janda, Decision-Making During Interrogation: Towards a New Approach
for Determining the Propensity of Deceptive Police Techniques to Produce False Confessions, 43 LIN-
COLN L. REV. 79, 80–81 (2015–16); Rinat Kitai-Sangero, Extending Miranda: Prohibition on
Police Lies Regarding the Incriminating Evidence, 54 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 611, 612 (2017); Louis
M. Natali, Jr., Essay, Can We Handle the Truth?, 85 TEMP. L. REV. 839, 839 (2013); Andrea
Reed, Note, The Use of False DNA Evidence to Gain a Confession During Interrogation is Classic
Coercion: Why Such Coerced Confessions Should Not Be Admissible in a Criminal Trial, 104 KY. L.J.
747, 749 (2016); Daniel W. Sasaki, Note, Guarding the Guardians: Police Trickery and Confes-
sions, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1593, 1612 (1988); James G. Thomas, Note, Police Use of Trickery as an
Interrogation Technique, 32 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1201 (1979); Welsh S. White, Miranda’s Fail-
ure to Restrain Pernicious Interrogation Practices, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1211, 1214 (1999) [hereinaf-
ter White, Miranda’s Failure]; Welsh S. White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U.
PA. L. REV. 581, 586 (1979) [hereinafter White, Police Trickery]; Katie Wynbrandt, Com-
ment, From False Evidence Ploy to False Guilty Plea: An Unjustified Path to Securing Convictions,
126 YALE L.J. 545, 548 (2016); Deborah Young, Unnecessary Evil: Police Lying in Interrogations,
28 CONN. L. REV. 425, 427 (1996). See also Robert P. Mosteller, Police Deception Before
Miranda Warnings: The Case for Per Se Prohibition of an Entirely Unjustified Practice at the Most
Critical Moment, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1239, 1240–41 (2007) (advocating a ban on pre-
warning deception).
For articles more or less defending the status quo, see Laurie Magid, Deceptive Police
Interrogation Practices: How Far is Too Far?, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1168, 1172 (2001); Miller W.
Shealy, Jr., The Hunting of Man: Lies, Damn Lies, and Police Interrogations, 4 U. MIAMI RACE &
SOC. JUST. L. REV. 21, 38–43 (2014).
For articles making subconstitutional policy arguments for greater constraints on
police deception, see Tonja Jacobi, Miranda 2.0, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2016);
Phillip E. Johnson, A Statutory Replacement for the Miranda Doctrine, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 303,
303 (1987); Irina Khasin, Note, Honesty Is the Best Policy: A Case for the Limitation of Deceptive
Police Interrogation Practices in the United States, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1029, 1032 (2009);
Susan R. Klein, Transparency and Truth During Custodial Interrogations and Beyond, 97 B.U. L.
REV. 993, 1002–3 (2017); Margaret L. Paris, Trust, Lies, and Interrogation, 3 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y
& L. 3, 9, 44–45 (1995); Laura Hoffman Roppé, Comment, True Blue?  Whether Police Should
be Allowed to Use Trickery and Deception to Extract Confessions, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 729,
732–33 (1994).
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both with our understanding of fraud and with modern Miranda jurispru-
dence.  Professor George Dix wrote forty-five years ago that “the use of decep-
tion to obtain a self-incriminating statement has caused the courts
unquestionable discomfort; yet existing doctrine provides no adequate vehi-
cle for concrete judicial expression of this attitude.”7  This Article takes up
the task of providing such a vehicle.
Part I examines Supreme Court and lower court precedent on deceptive
interrogation practices, separately analyzing several different overlapping
types of deceptive tactics.  Part II discusses some of the scholarly literature on
the subject, which generally: fails to provide (or in most cases, even attempt
to provide) a full account of why the law is what it is; places too much empha-
sis on reliability as a rationale behind constitutional constraints on interroga-
tion; and does not offer a genuinely coherent and useable standard for when
such practices are impermissible.  Part III argues that deceptive interrogation
practices are better examined under the rubric of fraud rather than coer-
cion.  It examines how this view fits in well with the Court’s evolving jurispru-
dence on Miranda waiver.  And it uses the standard articulated above to
mostly justify lower court decisions on police deception during interrogation.
I. POLICE DECEPTION DURING INTERROGATIONS
The Supreme Court has said remarkably little about deceptive police
interrogation tactics.  Although it criticized such practices in its landmark
decision in Miranda v. Arizona,8 it at the same time established the famous
warnings-and-waiver protocol in order to arm suspects with information to
help them stand up to such tactics.  Thus, the Miranda Court seemed to pre-
sume that such practices would continue.  Since then, it has approved of
some deceptive interrogation tactics, such as confronting the suspect with
false evidence of guilt and failing to disclose certain aspects of the interroga-
tion itself.  Lower courts have generally permitted deceptive police interroga-
tion practices, except where the deception involves false promises of
leniency, distorts the meaning of the Miranda warnings, or, sometimes,
involves matters extrinsic to the offense, such as matters affecting the sus-
pect’s family.  However, courts have failed to offer a principled approach to
separating acceptable from unacceptable police deception.
A. The Supreme Court on Police Deception
Both before and after its landmark decision in Miranda v. Arizona, the
Supreme Court addressed coercion in only a smattering of cases.  In these
cases, the Court made clear that police deception was acceptable as long as it,
along with any other arguably coercive elements of the interrogation, did not
overbear the will of the suspect.
7 George E. Dix, Mistake, Ignorance, Expectation of Benefit, and the Modern Law of Confes-
sions, 1975 WASH. U. L.Q. 275, 321.
8 384 U.S. 436, 439 (1966).
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In some cases, the deception took the form of a police stratagem that
hid or downplayed the adversarial nature of the police-suspect relationship.
For example, in Spano v. New York, the Court held a confession to have been
coerced after police used a “false friend” stratagem.9  Spano had called a
childhood friend of his, Bruno, then “a fledgling police officer,” shortly after
the killing about which Spano was being questioned.10  Bruno was later told
by higher-ups to play on Spano’s sympathy by pretending that Spano’s phone
call to him threatened his future career as a police officer, and consequently
the financial security of Bruno’s pregnant wife and their three children.11
Bruno did so, leading to Spano’s confession.12  However, Spano’s preceden-
tial value on police deception during interrogations is limited, given that the
Court relied on a whole host of other factors in concluding that Spano’s will
was overborne: Spano was “foreign-born,” had limited schooling, was emo-
tionally unstable, had no prior contact with the justice system, and was sub-
jected to interrogation by a team of skilled questioners over the course of
eight hours, in the face of Spano’s repeated refusals to answer and requests
to contact his attorney.13  In this context, the use of Bruno to falsely extract
sympathy was just “another factor which deserve[d] mention.”14
A stratagem to hide the adversarial posture of the police was also utilized
in Leyra v. Denno,15 along with a technique of minimizing the seriousness of
the offense.  There, the Court addressed a series of confessions made after a
police psychiatrist, posing as a general practitioner helping a murder suspect
with a sinus problem, convinced the suspect to confess.16  The Court
observed that the suspect was encouraged to confess “by the doctor’s assur-
ances that he had done no moral wrong and would be let off easily” if he
confessed.17  The full transcript of the interrogation, appended to the
Court’s decision, indicates that the doctor told the suspect such things as,
“[i]f you talk to me and open up, you’re going to feel relieved,”18 and “I am
here to help you.”19  The Court held that the confessions were coerced,20 but
because the deceptive aspects of the interrogation were interlaced with the
9 360 U.S. 315, 323 (1959).
10 Id. at 317.
11 Id. at 319.
12 Id.
13 See id. at 321–23.
14 Id. at 323; see Paris, supra note 6, at 54 (“Spano fails to clarify whether the falsity was
even necessary to the Court’s decision to reverse the conviction.  One strongly senses that
deception was not a sufficient cause.”).
15 347 U.S. 556, 560 (1954).
16 Id. at 559–61.
17 Id. at 560; see also id. at 562 (transcript of interrogation indicating that doctor had
told suspect that “in a fit of temper or anger we sometimes do things that we aren’t really
responsible for”).
18 Id. at 563.
19 Id. at 565.
20 Id. at 561.
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psychiatrist’s sophisticated, suggestive questioning techniques, Leyra is also of
limited precedential value as a case about police deception.21
In some cases, police falsely threatened to take official detrimental
actions against the suspect’s loved ones.  For example, in Rogers v. Richmond,
the suspect’s confession was induced when the police chief “pretended, in
[the suspect’s] hearing, to place a telephone call to police officers” telling
them to be ready to arrest the suspect’s wife.22  An hour later, after the chief
“indicated that he was about to have [the suspect’s] wife taken into custody,”
the suspect confessed.23  In Lynumn v. Illinois, the suspect confessed after
police told her that if she did not cooperate, the State would cut off financial
assistance to her two young children and that they would be taken from her
by the State.24  In both cases, the Court granted relief from the conviction.25
But neither Rogers nor Lynumn can tell us much about police deception
during interrogation.  For starters, it is unclear whether the police were even
lying in Lynumn—the Court’s opinion is bereft of any discussion of whether
and to what extent Lynumn was in any actual danger of losing her children.26
But even assuming the tactic in Lynumn was deceptive, it was coupled with a
more conventional deceptive interrogation tactic, a suggestion that coopera-
tion would lead to leniency.  So at best, Lynumn could stand for the proposi-
tion that both deceptive interrogation tactics together deprived the suspect
of due process.  But Lynumn is of limited usefulness because of a more funda-
mental reason: the State conceded in the Supreme Court that the confession
had been coerced and sought affirmance on procedural grounds.27  Thus,
the Court’s conclusion that the confession was coerced28 can be seen as less
than definitive.
Rogers suffers from some of the same defects.  First, it is unclear what
role deception played in any determination that the confession was coerced.
The chief only pretended to threaten to arrest the suspect’s wife, true, but
the opinion does not tell us whether such an arrest, if it had actually been
made, would have been based on reasonable grounds.  The Second Circuit
21 See George E. Dix, Waiver in Criminal Procedure: A Brief for More Careful Analysis, 55
TEX. L. REV. 193, 201 (1977) (noting that “it is impossible to compare the significance of
the deception and of the other elements present in” Spano and Leyra); Hamblet, supra
note 6, at 120 (observing that in both Spano and Leyra, “the deception was coupled with
other aggravating conditions which permitted the Court to base its decision on the totality
of circumstances”).
22 365 U.S. 534, 535 (1961).
23 Id. at 535–36.
24 372 U.S. 528, 531–34 (1963).
25 Rogers, 365 U.S. at 549; Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 529.
26 See Paris, supra note 6, at 51 (“Although Lynumn is cited sometimes as a decision
disapproving of false promises of leniency, the Court’s decision in no way turned on the
falsity of the officers’ representations.  In fact, the officers’ threats may well have been
true.”).
27 See Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 534–35.
28 Id. at 534.
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opinion in the case indicates that it would have.29  If so, the chief’s bluff takes
on the character of an idle threat rather than a complete artifice.30  In any
event, Rogers, like Lynumn, is of limited utility because the Court never
decided that the confession was coerced; indeed, it conceded that “the issue
of voluntariness might fairly have gone either way.”31  The case was instead
decided on what might be fairly termed procedural grounds: that the defen-
dant was deprived of due process because the state courts had deemed the
confession voluntary using an improper standard that focused on the reliabil-
ity of the confession rather than the effect of the police conduct on the sus-
pect’s will.32
Three years after Rogers, the Supreme Court issued its landmark decision
in Miranda v. Arizona, which famously declared that custodial interrogation
was subject to the constraints of the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth
Amendment33 and compulsion for purposes of that Clause is inherent in all
custodial interrogation.34  The Court required that any statements resulting
from custodial interrogation to be preceded by warnings of the suspect’s
right to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel during the inter-
rogation, and to be occasioned by a waiver of those rights.35  In coming to
that conclusion, the Court canvassed a number of police interrogation tactics
that it gleaned from police interrogation manuals, many of which were
deceptive in nature.  For example, the manuals advised police to display con-
fidence in the suspect’s guilt;36 to downplay the seriousness of the offense
under investigation;37 to use a rigged identification procedure38 or a “reverse
line-up,” in which the suspect is identified as the perpetrator of a fictitious
29 United States ex rel. Rogers v. Richmond, 271 F.2d 364, 371 (2d Cir. 1959) (observ-
ing that Rogers’s wife “was a legitimate subject of police inquiry”), rev’d, 365 U.S. 534
(1961).
30 See Dix, supra note 7, at 305 n.110 (“[P]roperly read, Rogers is not a deception case.
The substance of the police action was to threaten coercion.  The officer’s lack of intention
to carry out the threat was insignificant compared to his making it.” (citation omitted)).
31 See Rogers, 365 U.S. at 548 n.5.
32 Id. at 544–45.  An earlier Supreme Court decision mentioned in passing that the
suspect in that case “was falsely told that other suspects had ‘opened up’ on him.”  Turner
v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62, 64 (1949).  Although the Court concluded that the confession
was coerced, id. at 65, it did not discuss the falsehood in coming to that conclusion, per-
haps because the suspect continued to “repeatedly” deny his guilt after the deception, id.
at 64, and so the deception likely did not cause him to confess.
33 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).  The Self-Incrimination Clause provides: “No person . . .
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .” U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
34 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457–58.
35 Id. at 444–45.  The Court also created the right of the suspect “to cut off question-
ing,” id. at 474, though not the right to be informed of this right. See Laurent Sacharoff,
Miranda’s Hidden Right, 63 ALA. L. REV. 535, 552–56 (2012).
36 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 450.
37 Id. at 450–51.
38 Id. at 453.
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crime in the hopes that he will confess to the real one;39 and to employ the
“Mutt and Jeff” (or “good cop–bad cop”) routine, which relies on one officer
offering false sympathy to the suspect.40  However, the Court was careful not
to declare any of these deceptive practices off limits to the police, unlike the
physical and psychological coercion seen in thirty years of the Court’s cases,
which the Court explicitly sought to “eradicate[ ].”41  The only other men-
tion of deception in the opinion relates not to the interrogation itself but to
the waiver of the Miranda rights.  The Court wrote that “any evidence that
the accused was threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a waiver will, of course,
show that the defendant did not voluntarily waive his privilege.”42
Post-Miranda, the Court has had little occasion to directly address police
deception during interrogations.43  However, beginning with Frazier v.
Cupp,44 a handful of cases have generally permitted such deception.45  In
Frazier, the murder suspect was subjected to two different kinds of deception:
he was falsely told that his alleged accomplice had already confessed, and he
was offered false sympathy by the officer, who suggested that the victim had
precipitated his own death “by making homosexual advances.”46  The Court
39 Id.
40 Id. at 452.
41 Id. at 446–47. See Jacobi, supra note 6, at 64 (“Miranda did not prohibit police
deception . . . .”); Kitai-Sangero, supra note 6, at 621 (“[T]he Miranda Court did not
restrict lying and deceit during interrogations after the suspect waives his Miranda
rights.”); Magid, supra note 6, at 1175 (“Although the Miranda Court appeared to take a
negative view of deceptive interrogation techniques, the Court imposed few limits on their
use.”); Robert P. Mosteller, Moderating Investigative Lies by Disclosure and Documentation, 76
OR. L. REV. 833, 848 n.57 (1997) (“[A]lthough surely not encouraging deception, Miranda
anticipated that [such] investigative practices would continue . . . .”); Paris, supra note 6, at
57 (“From these passages we can discern the Court’s aversion to ‘deceptive stratagems’ and
tricks.  Yet, it was neither lies nor tricks upon which the decision in Miranda turned.”).
Some have read this language more hopefully. See White, Miranda’s Failure, supra note 6,
at 1217 (“The Miranda decision’s apparent disapproval of interrogation techniques
described in various interrogation manuals . . . could have been interpreted to prohibit
interrogators from employing those practices.” (footnote omitted)).
42 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476. See Magid, supra note 6, at 1175 n.37 (“Miranda does limit
the use of deception in obtaining a waiver . . . .”); White, Police Trickery, supra note 6, at 582
(observing that the Miranda “[d]ictum . . . indicates that police are precluded from using
trickery to induce a waiver of a suspect’s fifth and sixth amendment rights”); cf. Thomas,
supra note 6, at 1185 (noting that, although “[o]n its face this statement only prohibited
the use of trickery in obtaining a waiver,” it “led some observers to conclude that the Court
had completely outlawed the use of deceptive interrogation techniques.” (emphasis
omitted)).
43 See Klein, supra note 6, at 1033 (“[T]he Court has not directly blessed or rejected
any of the pre-Miranda techniques that the Warren Court found troublesome.”).
44 394 U.S. 731 (1969).
45 Jacobi, supra note 6, at 64–65 (observing that “both before and after Miranda, the
Court has explicitly allowed” police deception (footnotes omitted)); Young, supra note 6,
at 451 (“Frazier signaled that the Court’s post-Miranda interpretation of voluntariness was
broad enough to permit police lying.”).
46 Frazier, 394 U.S. at 737–38.
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tersely rejected Frazier’s claim that the resulting confession was coerced:
“The fact that the police misrepresented the statements that [the accom-
plice] had made is, while relevant, insufficient . . . to make this otherwise
voluntary confession inadmissible.”47
The Court has also put its imprimatur on deception about whether offi-
cial questioning is even occurring.  In Illinois v. Perkins, an undercover police
agent posing as a fellow inmate elicited incriminating statements from Per-
kins while at a county jail.48  Perkins argued in the Supreme Court that his
statement was inadmissible because it was not preceded by Miranda warn-
ings,49 a contention which, if successful, would obviously have spelled the
end for undercover elicitation of incriminating statements in a custodial set-
ting.  The Court rejected this argument on the ground that the inherent
coercion of custodial interrogation was absent when an incarcerated inmate
did not know he was being questioned by a law enforcement agent.50  The
Court did find coercion involving undercover questioning of an incarcerated
suspect in Arizona v. Fulminante.51  However, there, the deception was beside
the point: the Court found coercion because of an implicit threat to leave the
suspect unprotected against the private violence of others, a threat that
would have been coercive even if the undercover officer had indeed been a
fellow inmate.52  Indeed, the Fulminante Court did not say one word about
the legal effect, if any, of the deception practiced in that case. Perkins and
Fulminante together strongly suggest that deception about whether an inter-
rogation is even taking place is generally permissible.
In subsequent cases on waiver, the Court has held that omission of some
information regarding the incipient custodial interrogation does not render
an ensuing waiver invalid.  So in Colorado v. Spring, the Court held that failure
to tell the suspect that the interrogation would concern a different, more
serious crime than the one for which he was arrested did not vitiate his
waiver.53  And in Moran v. Burbine, the Court held that failure to inform the
suspect that a lawyer had been retained on his behalf and sought to represent
him during the interrogation likewise did not invalidate the suspect’s
waiver.54  In Spring, the Court reserved decision on whether an affirmative
misrepresentation of the same information, as opposed to a mere omission,
would void a Miranda waiver.55  And the Burbine opinion suggests the same.56
The Burbine Court allowed only that “on facts more egregious than those
47 Id. at 739; see Paris, supra note 6, at 59.
48 496 U.S. 292, 294–95 (1990).
49 See id. at 295–96.
50 Id. at 296–97.
51 499 U.S. 279, 286–87 (1991).
52 Id. at 287–88; see also Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 564–65, 567 (1958) (holding
confession coerced where police implied that lack of cooperation could lead to suspect’s
being released to angry mob outside jail).
53 479 U.S. 564, 575–76 (1987).
54 475 U.S. 412, 416–18, 421–24 (1986).
55 Spring, 479 U.S. at 576 n.8; see CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS 403 (3d ed. 1993) (observing
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presented” in that case, “police deception might rise to a level of a due pro-
cess violation.”57
In only one case, Missouri v. Seibert, has the Supreme Court found a
waiver invalid because of police deception, although it involved a fairly dis-
tinctive type of deception, and the Court focused on the effectiveness of the
warnings rather than the validity of the waiver.58  In Seibert, police used the
“question first” tactic, whereby police would question the suspect without
benefit of Miranda warnings in order to get an initial, albeit inadmissible,
confession.59  Police would then issue the warnings and obtain a waiver in a
subsequent round of questioning without revealing the inadmissibility of the
prior statements.60  A plurality of the Court determined that the second state-
ment, too, was inadmissible, because the practice of giving the warnings only
after an initial statement was made rendered those warnings ineffective, at
least in some cases.61  Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment, focusing
on the police use of a deceptive stratagem rather than the multifactored test
suggested by the plurality: “If the deliberate two-step strategy has been used,
postwarning statements that are related to the substance of prewarning state-
ments must be excluded unless curative measures are taken before the
postwarning statement is made.”62
that Spring “suggested that trickery does not occur unless police engage in ‘affirmative
representation’”).
56 Burbine, 475 U.S. at 453 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]here can be no constitutional
distinction—as the Court appears to draw—between a deceptive misstatement and the
concealment by the police of the critical fact that an attorney retained by the accused or
his family has offered assistance . . . .” (citation omitted)); see also Mosteller, supra note 6, at
1253 (“[T]he failure to state information is potentially distinguishable from an affirmative
misrepresentation.”).
57 Burbine, 475 U.S. at 432 (majority opinion).
58 542 U.S. 600, 612 n.4 (2004) (plurality opinion) (“In a sequential confession case,
clarity is served if the later confession is approached by asking whether in the circum-
stances the Miranda warnings given could reasonably be found effective.”); cf. Oregon v.
Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 318 (1985) (positing the question as whether “a suspect who has once
responded to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is . . . thereby disabled from waiving his
rights”).
59 Siebert, 542 U.S. at 609–11 (plurality opinion).
60 Id.
61 Id. at 613–14, 615 (pointing to “the completeness and detail of the questions and
answers in the first round of interrogation, the overlapping content of the two statements,
the timing and setting of the first and the second, the continuity of police personnel, and
the degree to which the interrogator’s questions treated the second round as continuous
with the first”).
62 Id. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).  Although Justice Breyer
joined the plurality, which disclaimed reliance on the interrogating officer’s state of mind,
id. at 616 n.6 (plurality opinion) (“[T]he focus is on facts apart from intent that show the
question-first tactic at work.”), he also wrote a concurring opinion that, like Justice Ken-
nedy’s, seemed to hinge on the intent of the officer. See id. at 617 (Breyer, J., concurring)
(“Courts should exclude the ‘fruits’ of the initial unwarned questioning unless the failure
to warn was in good faith.”).
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The holding of Seibert is unclear.  No rationale enjoyed the support of
five Justices, and Justice Kennedy’s separate opinion placing heavy reliance
on the intent of the police, which might otherwise be deemed controlling via
the rule of Marks v. United States,63 seems to have been rejected by at least
seven other Justices.64  However, Seibert does indicate that deception that
“deprive[s] a suspect of an adequate understanding of her Miranda rights” is
not permissible.65
Thus, Supreme Court precedent on police deception during interroga-
tion is both fairly sparse and relatively permissive.66  The pre-Miranda rulings
are of limited precedential value, in part precisely because they predate
Miranda.  Most post-Miranda cases—Perkins, Burbine, Spring, and Seibert—
focus on police deception only as it affects the necessity or validity of the
Miranda warnings-and-waiver protocol itself, not the voluntariness of the con-
fession, and the latter three involve deceptive omissions rather than affirma-
tive misrepresentations.  The cursory treatment of deceptive interrogation
practices found in the fifty-year-old Frazier v. Cupp remains the Court’s defini-
tive treatment of the subject.
By contrast, the lower courts have seen a plethora of cases involving
police deception during interrogation.  Guided by Frazier, most such prac-
tices have been approved, or at least tolerated, by the courts.
B. Taxonomy of Police Deception
The lower courts have addressed a wide range of what can be considered
deceptive police interrogation practices.67  Taking their cue from the few
Supreme Court cases in this area, particularly Frazier, they have permitted
most kinds of deception.68  Specifically, they generally permit deception
63 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single
rationale . . . enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as
that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds.’” (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976))).
64 See supra note 62; Seibert, 542 U.S. at 624 (O’Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.,
and Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting) (“The plurality’s rejection of an intent-based test
is . . . correct.”).
65 Gohara, supra note 6, at 799.
66 Hritz, supra note 6, at 492 (“The Supreme Court has declined to clearly define when
police deception can be overly coercive.”); Thomas, supra note 6, at 1183 (“[T]he
Supreme Court never squarely addressed the issue of whether a confession induced by
trickery was involuntary.”); White, Miranda’s Failure, supra note 6, at 1241 (“[T]he Court
has never articulated any basis for evaluating the propriety of particular types of interro-
gators’ trickery.”); White, Police Trickery, supra note 6, at 585 (bemoaning the lack of “con-
crete guidance needed to determine the legitimacy of particular police practices”).
67 Khasin, supra note 6, at 1038–43; Roppé, supra note 6, at 734–36; Young, supra note
6, at 429–32.
68 Gohara, supra note 6, at 794; Heyl, supra note 6, at 943; Khasin, supra note 6, at
1048–49; Kitai-Sangero, supra note 6, at 613–15; Magid, supra note 6, at 1177; Roppé, supra
note 6, at 751; Slobogin, supra note 6, at 1177; Stuntz, supra note 6, at 763; Wynbrandt,
supra note 6, at 551; Young, supra note 6, at 426.
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about the adversary role of the police (such as false expressions of sympathy),
verbal deception about the existence of other incriminating evidence, and
minimization of the offense (i.e., falsely suggesting that the offense is less
serious than it really is).69  A small minority of courts have drawn the line at
fabrication of incriminating evidence.  And courts generally disapprove of
deception that negates the meaning of the Miranda warnings, deception that
falsely promises leniency in exchange for cooperation, and some deception
aimed at matters outside the interrogation room, such as some misrepresen-
tations involving the suspect’s family members.  However, courts have failed
to offer a general account that explains these results.70
1. Deception About the Adversary Role of the Police (The False
Sympathy Ploy)
Courts generally permit police deception regarding their own adversary
role in the criminal justice process.  This type of deception typically involves
expressions of empathy with and sympathy for the suspect.  For example,
courts have approved use of the “good cop, bad cop” routine,71 telling the
suspect that confession will make him feel better,72 and falsely “suggest[ing]
that they would act on Defendant’s behalf in going to the district attorney.”73
Even in extreme cases, courts are unmoved by this type of deception.  For
example, in Mason v. State, the Texas Court of Appeals held that a confession
was not coerced where one interrogating officer told the suspect, believed to
have molested a five-year-old girl, that he, too, was a pedophile.74  Likewise,
in State v. Ulch, an Ohio appeals court held a confession was not coerced after
one officer told the suspect, who was being questioned about injuries to his
girlfriend’s three-year-old daughter, “that she had done things to her own
child that she was not proud of.”75  Thus, false expressions of sympathy and
empathy by police are generally considered noncoercive.
69 Of course, these categories overlap.  For example, when police falsely suggest that
the murder victim might be in some way responsible for her own death, they are at once
expressing false sympathy for the suspect, falsely minimizing the crime, and suggesting the
possibility of leniency.  Moreover, deception about the existence of incriminating evidence
is often accompanied by false expressions of confidence in the suspect’s guilt and false
suggestions that the crime is more serious than it actually is, which some might treat as
separate categories.  In addition, when multiple tactics are used, it becomes difficult to
attribute causation to any particular tactic.  Slobogin, supra note 6, at 1177.  However, it is
useful to separate out these different tactics for purposes of analysis.
70 See Heyl, supra note 6, at 944 (“Clearly there is a limit to deception, but courts have
not articulated where the line is drawn.”).
71 See, e.g., Pierce v. State, 761 N.E.2d 821, 824 (Ind. 2002); cf. Conner v. State, 982
S.W.2d 655, 660 (Ark. 1998) (expressing discomfort with this technique but finding that it
did not induce the confession).
72 See State v. Marini, 638 A.2d 507, 512–13 (R.I. 1994).
73 State v. Bunting, 2002 UT App 195, ¶ 26, 51 P.3d 37, 44.
74 116 S.W.3d 248, 260–62 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003).
75 No. L-00-1355, 2002 WL 597397, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2002).
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2. Verbal Deception About Independent Evidence of Guilt (The False
Evidence Ploy)
One of the most common uses of deception of which courts almost uni-
versally approve is falsely informing the suspect that they already have strong
evidence of her guilt.  Courts have deemed noncoerced confessions induced
by false statements about: physical evidence,76 including DNA evidence,77
tying the suspect to the crime; information provided by supposed witnesses to
the crime;78 and statements by the suspect’s accomplices.79  For example, in
State v. Register, police used a number of these related tactics by falsely telling
the suspect “that he had been seen with the [v]ictim the night she was mur-
dered, that his tires and shoes matched impressions and prints found at the
murder scene, and that they had irrefutable DNA evidence establishing his
guilt.”80  The South Carolina Supreme Court found the police deception
76 See United States v. Bell, 367 F.3d 452, 462 (5th Cir. 2004) (falsely telling suspect
physical evidence linked him to rape); Goodwin v. State, 281 S.W.3d 258, 266 (Ark. 2008)
(falsely telling suspect the crime was caught on videotape); Ex parte Jackson, 836 So. 2d
979, 984–85 (Ala. 2002) (falsely telling suspect his fingerprints were found on item tying
him to alleged accomplice); Luckhart v. State, 736 N.E.2d 227, 230–32 (Ind. 2000) (falsely
telling suspect his fingerprints were found at the crime scene); State v. Kelekolio, 849 P.2d
58, 71–74 (Haw. 1993) (falsely telling suspect that rape victim displayed bruising and evi-
dence of sexual activity); Mason v. State, 116 S.W.3d 248, 258–59 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003)
(falsely telling suspect medical evidence showed victim’s vagina had been penetrated);
Bunting, 2002 UT App 195, ¶ 16–18, 51 P.3d at 42–43 (falsely telling suspect medical exam-
iner had determined victim was murdered); State v. Critt, 554 N.W.2d 93, 96 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1996) (falsely telling suspect of surveillance video of crime); State v. Davila, 908 P.2d
581, 585 (Idaho Ct. App. 1995) (falsely implying to suspect his fingerprints were found on
bag containing drugs); People v. Spellman, 562 N.Y.S.2d 652, 653 (App. Div. 1990) (falsely
telling suspect his fingerprints were found at crime scene); Ulch, 2002 WL 597397, at *3
(falsely telling suspect knuckle marks and bruising on victim indicated she had been hit by
adult male).
77 See United States v. Welch, No. 93-4043, 1994 WL 514522, at *5 (6th Cir. Sept. 19,
1994) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision) (falsely telling suspect that DNA evi-
dence showed victim could not have died from Sudden Infant Death Syndrome).
78 See, e.g., Holland v. McGinnis, 963 F.2d 1044, 1051 (7th Cir. 1992) (falsely telling
suspect that witness saw his car at the crime scene); Luckhart v. State, 736 N.E.2d 227,
230–32 (Ind. 2000) (falsely telling suspect two witnesses placed her at the crime scene);
Rodriquez v. State, 934 S.W.2d 881, 890–91 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996) (falsely telling suspect
victim identified him as perpetrator); Farmah v. State, 789 S.W.2d 665, 671–72 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1990) (same).
79 See, e.g., State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 936 (Utah 1998) (falsely telling suspect all three
accomplices implicated him when only one had); State v. Thaggard, 527 N.W.2d 804, 806,
810–11 (Minn. 1995) (falsely telling suspect accomplice had confessed); State v. Sanford,
569 So. 2d 147, 152 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (falsely telling suspect that accomplice inculpated
him).
80 476 S.E.2d 153, 158 (S.C. 1996).
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“deplorable” but concluded that the suspect’s will was not overborne.81  This
position, it seems, is all but universal.82
3. Fabrication of Independent Evidence of Guilt (The Fabricated
Evidence Ploy)
One area where a small minority of courts draw the line is at actual crea-
tion of false physical or documentary evidence of the suspect’s guilt.  The
leading case is State v. Cayward, where police showed the suspect two
fabricated forensic reports purporting to show that biological material
belonging to the suspect was found on the young victim’s underwear.83  Find-
ing a “qualitative difference between . . . verbal artifices . . . and the presenta-
tion of . . . falsely contrived scientific documents,” the Florida District Court
of Appeal drew a “bright line” forbidding the latter while permitting the for-
mer.84  The court reasoned that “a suspect [may be] . . . more easily induced
to confess when presented with tangible, official-looking reports as opposed
to merely being told that some tests have implicated him.”85  The court also
expressed “distaste” for the practice, comparing it to “the horrors of less
advanced centuries in our civilization.”86  Finally, the court expressed some
practical concerns regarding the use of fabricated evidence: the potential
that such evidence might inadvertently find its way into the courtroom or
released to the media, whether inadvertently or intentionally, and that use of
fabricated evidence in interrogation would erode public confidence in the
police.87  The Superior Court of New Jersey adopted the reasoning of
Cayward in State v. Patton, though it held more narrowly that police could not
use during interrogations “police-fabricated evidence that later finds its way
into the trial.”88  It is difficult to understand how a confession can retroac-
81 Id.
82 But see State v. Baker, 465 P.3d 860, 878–79 (Haw. 2020) (finding coercion in a case
where police made repeated “misrepresentations about the existence of incontrovertible
physical evidence that directly implicate[d] the accused”); Ex parte Hill, 557 So. 2d 838, 842
(Ala. 1989) (disapproving of false evidence ploy in light of suspect’s “borderline mental
retardation, his schizophrenic personality or schizoid personality disorder, the evidence of
possible brain damage, and [his] emotional state at the time of the interrogation”).
83 552 So. 2d 971, 972 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
84 Id. at 973–74; see also State v. Grey, 907 P.2d 951, 955 (Mont. 1995) (holding confes-
sion coerced, in part because police placed a video camera in the store where the crime
took place to create the false impression that the crime had been recorded); cf. Common-
wealth v. DiGiambattista, 813 N.E.2d 516, 524–28 (Mass. 2004) (displaying concern about
use of false file folder and mislabeled videotape to create the impression of voluminous
incriminating evidence, but ultimately deeming confession coerced on other grounds);
Roppé, supra note 6, at 761 (“[F]alsified documents might taint the entire criminal justice
system . . . .”).
85 Cayward, 552 So. 2d at 974.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 974–75.
88 State v. Patton, 826 A.2d 783, 804 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003).  In Patton, the
suspect’s confession was induced by an audio recording that police falsely told him was an
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tively become coerced the instant that materials that were used to elicit it are
introduced at trial.
In any event, most courts that have addressed the issue disagree with
Cayward and Patton and hold that fabrication of physical evidence is not coer-
cive.  In People v. Smith, the defendant challenged as coercive administration
of a sham procedure with the unlikely name “Neutron Proton Negligence
Intelligence Test,” whereby chemicals were administered to his hands, which
then turned colors, and he was told the results indicated he had recently
fired a gun.89  The California Supreme Court rejected the argument, deem-
ing the sham test noncoercive.90  In State v. Von Dohlen, the defendant simi-
larly argued that his confession was coerced after the police showed him (1)
spent shell casings, falsely telling him they were recovered in relation to his
alleged crime, and (2) a supposed composite sketch that was actually drawn
by a police artist by viewing the suspect.91  The South Carolina Supreme
Court rejected the argument that these tactics overbore his will.92  In Sheriff
v. Bessey, defendant claimed that he was coerced into confessing after an
officer showed him a fabricated forensic report showing the presence of
semen where his sexual act with an underage girl allegedly occurred.93  The
Nevada Supreme Court rejected the contention, holding this tactic noncoer-
cive.94  And in Lincoln v. State, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals
rejected the defendant’s contention that showing him fabricated witness
statements was coercive.95
interview with an eyewitness to the crime but was, in actuality, a fabricated recording, with
one officer pretending to be the eyewitness. Id. at 785–89.
89 150 P.3d 1224, 1238 (Cal. 2007).
90 Id. at 1241–42; see also Whittington v. State, 809 A.2d 721, 734 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2002) (deeming similar sham test noncoercive).
91 471 S.E.2d 689, 694 (S.C. 1996).
92 Id. at 695–96.
93 Sheriff, Washoe Cty. v. Bessey, 914 P.2d 618, 619 (Nev. 1996).
94 Id. at 621; see also United States v. Haynes, 26 F. App’x 123, 128–29, 134 (4th Cir.
2001) (per curiam) (rejecting claim of coercion where suspect shown a fabricated ballistics
report and boxes purportedly containing evidence in his case but actually containing unre-
lated materials); Ledbetter v. Edwards, 35 F.3d 1062, 1066, 1070 (6th Cir. 1994) (finding
no coercion where suspect shown enlarged photographs of fingerprints supposedly taken
from crime scene and falsely told they matched suspect’s); Springer v. Commonwealth, 998
S.W.2d 439, 445, 447–49 (Ky. 1999) (finding no coercion where suspect shown video to
convince suspect that house where crime occurred was under electronic surveillance);
Commonwealth v. Selby, 651 N.E.2d 843, 845–46, 848–49 (Mass. 1995) (finding no coer-
cion where suspect was shown handprint and falsely told it was his and was taken from
crime scene); Arthur v. Commonwealth, 480 S.E.2d 749, 751–52 (Va. Ct. App. 1997)
(rejecting claim of coercion based on use of false lab reports).
95 882 A.2d 944, 959–60 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005).
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4. Deceptive Suggestions That the Offense is Less Serious than It Really
Is (The Minimization Ploy)
Courts have also put their imprimatur on “minimization” techniques, by
which police try to elicit a confession by deceptively downplaying the serious-
ness of the crime.  For example, in homicide cases, courts have declined to
find a statement coerced simply because the police falsely told the suspect
that the victim was still alive.96  They have also declined to find coercion
where police misled the suspect by “exaggerat[ing] the difference in punish-
ment that might be imposed on an accomplice rather than a principal” or
that “punishment would be much less severe if the murder were not premedi-
tated.”97  One particularly stark example of minimization is State v. Cooper.98
There, the defendant, found guilty and condemned to death for the kidnap-
ping, rape, and murder of a six-year-old girl, claimed his confession had been
coerced because the police misled him into thinking that the maximum pun-
ishment he faced was a prison term rather than the death penalty.99  The
New Jersey Supreme Court ruled the confession not coerced, finding that the
detective’s statement was “not entirely inaccurate,” because “[a]lthough a
police officer may suspect that the murder will be death-eligible, the officer
has no way of knowing for sure.”100  Given the facts of the case, this reason-
ing borders on the farcical and betrays instead a level of comfort with the
officer’s deception.
Sometimes, minimization takes the form of suggestions that the suspect
has a viable defense or that the victim was partly to blame.  For example, in
People v. Fundaro, the defendant claimed that his confession was coerced
because “the officers kept telling him that it sounded like it was an accident
or self-defense and that it would be better for him if he would just tell them
what happened.”101  The Court of Appeals of Michigan concluded that
“[a]lthough the officers might have helped [Fundaro] rationalize his actions
in such a way that he might hope that he would not be charged with mur-
der,” they rejected the contention “that his will was overborne or [that] his
capacity for self-determination was critically impaired.”102  Likewise, in Mar-
tin v. State, the Florida Supreme Court rejected a claim of coercion where the
detective told the suspect “I think what happened here was an accident,” and
went on to say: “There is [sic] many a times that I have had cases where it was
justified, excusable, there was not intent.  Stuff like that, okay and it just dis-
appeared.  But you know what happened in all those cases[?]  Everybody
stepped up and told the truth.”103  And in State v. Hatfield, the Arizona Court
96 See, e.g., People v. Jordan, 597 N.Y.S.2d 807, 808–09 (App. Div. 1993).
97 State v. Bacon, 658 A.2d 54, 64 (Vt. 1995).
98 700 A.2d 306 (N.J. 1997).
99 Id. at 313, 319.
100 Id. at 320.
101 No. 301194, 2012 WL 247759, at *5 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2012) (per curiam).
102 Id. at *6.
103 107 So. 3d 281, 307, 310 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam).
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of Appeals held that the police were not coercive when they suggested to a
rape suspect that the thirteen-year-old victim “came on to [him].”104
Courts have held minimization to be impermissible only by conflating it
with a promise of leniency, which is discussed below.105  For example, in State
v. Ritter, the defendant claimed his confession was coerced because the police
falsely told him that the victim was still alive.106  The court found that this
deception “constituted an implied promise that Ritter could not be charged
with murder if he gave a statement to the police.”107  Having interpreted the
deception about the severity of the crime as a promise of leniency in
exchange for a confession, the court held the confession properly sup-
pressed.108  This reasoning is transparently faulty: the deception caused the
suspect to believe that he could not be charged with murder regardless of
whether he gave a statement to the police, not as consideration for a confes-
sion.  Similarly, in Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts pointed to the minimization techniques used by
officers and held the confession coerced because use of such techniques
“implies leniency if the suspect will adopt that minimized version of the
crime.”109  But the touchstone of such a case is the implied promise of leni-
ency; overwhelmingly, courts have concluded that minimization of the sever-
ity of the crime itself is not sufficient but is relevant only to the extent that it
can be reasonably interpreted as a promise of leniency.
5. Deception That Contradicts or Distorts the Meaning of the Miranda
Warnings
One place where the courts draw the line is at deception that directly
contradicts or distorts the meaning of the Miranda warnings.  As the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit put it: “An officer cannot read the
defendant his Miranda warnings and then turn around and tell him that
despite those warnings, what the defendant tells the officer will be confiden-
tial and still use the resultant confession against the defendant.”110  In a
number of cases, courts have deemed coerced statements that followed
104 840 P.2d 300, 301, 303 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
105 See infra subsection I.B.6.
106 485 S.E.2d 492, 493–94 (Ga. 1997).
107 Id. at 495.
108 Id.
109 813 N.E.2d 516, 526, 528 (Mass. 2004).
110 Hopkins v. Cockrell, 325 F.3d 579, 585 (5th Cir. 2003).  The court there held the
confession was coerced but that the error in admitting it was harmless. Id. at 584–85.
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police assurances that their conversation was “off the record”111 or
“confidential.”112
In a slightly different vein are cases involving the “now or never” ploy, in
which police falsely tell the suspect that the interrogation is her last and only
opportunity for her to make her side of the story known.  For example, in
Commonwealth v. Novo, police repeatedly told the suspect that if he did not
give his version of events, the jury would never hear it.113  The court held the
resulting confession to have been coerced on the ground that the “now or
never” tactic mischaracterized the suspect’s constitutional right to defend
himself at trial.114  One might quibble that Novo suggests that a misrepresen-
tation of any of the suspect’s rights, even those not covered by Miranda,
might render a resulting confession coerced.  Looked at more closely, how-
ever, a distortion of the Miranda rights was precisely what was going on in
Novo.  By telling Novo that the interrogation was his only opportunity to get
his defense to the jury, police were essentially telling him that by invoking his
right to silence or to end the interrogation altogether, he would be destroy-
ing any chance he had to make out a defense.  And presumably this would be
true even if he sought independent legal advice only on the narrow issue of
whether the police representations regarding his ability to put on a defense
were valid.  Thus, the “now or never” technique falsely conveyed to the sus-
pect that exercising or invoking his Miranda rights would doom whatever
chances he had at trial.
6. False Promises or Suggestions of Leniency in Exchange for Confession
Another ploy courts regularly hold impermissible is making false
promises of leniency, nonprosecution, immunity, or the like in exchange for
a confession.  Sometimes this takes the form of an explicit promise of leni-
ency.  For example, in Smith v. State, the suspect confessed only after the state
trooper assured him “that he was ‘not interested in prosecuting anyone for
drunk driving;’ he only wanted to find out who had been driving.”115  The
Alaska Court of Appeals held the confession “plainly induced by the promise
111 See United States v. Conley, 859 F. Supp. 830, 837 (W.D. Pa. 1994) (mem.) (finding
coercion where agent told suspect that their conversation was “off the record”); Jones v.
State, 65 P.3d 903, 905, 909 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003) (holding confession coerced where
officer told suspect their conversation was “[o]ff the record between you and I [sic]”).
112 Cole v. State, 923 P.2d 820, 826, 832 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996) (holding a confession
coerced where, among other instances of deception, police falsely assured suspect that the
tape of the interrogation “would [not] be played publicly, in ‘a public courtroom’” and
that conversation would be “very confidential”); State v. McConkie, 2000 ME 158, ¶¶ 1–10,
755 A.2d 1075, 1077–78 (finding coercion where officer told suspect his answers would
remain “confidential”); State v. Stanga, 2000 S.D. 129, ¶¶ 1–5, 617 N.W.2d 486, 487 (hold-
ing that promise by officer that statements would be kept “between you and me” consti-
tuted coercion); see also Linares v. State, 471 S.E.2d 208, 211–12 (Ga. 1996) (finding
coercion where officer told suspect that nothing he said would be used against him).
113 812 N.E.2d 1169, 1171–72, 1172 n.2 (Mass. 2004).
114 Id. at 1174–75.
115 787 P.2d 1038, 1039 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990).
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of leniency and must consequently be deemed involuntary.”116  Likewise, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Williams v. Withrow held a con-
fession coerced when it was induced by the officers’ promise that if he told
the truth, he would “walk.”117  In People v. Esqueda, the police repeatedly and
strongly suggested that the only way the suspect could avoid prison was if he
admitted to the shooting.118  The California Court of Appeal held the confes-
sion to be coerced.119
Sometimes, police will tell the suspect that if he makes a statement, they
will not arrest him, or that he will “go home.”  For example, in People v.
Thomas, among other tactics, police assured the suspect that once he dis-
closed how his son had been hurt, “he would not be arrested, but would be
permitted to return home.”120  The New York Court of Appeals held that
“[i]t is plain that [Thomas] was cajoled into his inculpatory [statements] by
these assurances.”121  Sometimes, police will tell the suspect that the point of
the interrogation is to get the suspect mental health or other assistance.  For
example, in Cole v. State, the Alaska Court of Appeals held it was impermissi-
bly coercive for an officer to couch his request for information as a way of
getting “help” for the suspect, to such an extent that he effectively told the
suspect “that the psychological help [the suspect] had requested would be
withheld unless and until [he] confessed.”122
While courts generally agree that false promises of leniency will vitiate
the voluntariness of a confession, there is widespread litigation of what
amounts to a promise.123  Thus, in Mason v. State, the defendant claimed his
confession was coerced because officers told him that “things would ‘go bet-
116 Id.
117 944 F.2d 284, 286, 289 (6th Cir. 1991), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 507 U.S. 680
(1993).
118 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 126, 136–43 (Ct. App. 1993).
119 Id. at 147–48; see also United States v. Young, 964 F.3d 938, 943–44 (10th Cir. 2020)
(finding coercion where federal agent told suspect that he could “physically buy down the
amount of time [he would spend] in a federal prison” and that “every time [the suspect
answered] a question truthfully, it ticks time off that record”); Albritton v. State, 769 So. 2d
438, 440, 442 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (finding confession coerced when it was induced by
a detective’s representation “that if [she] confessed that she committed the offense [abuse
of a dead body] as part of a religious ritual, she would be constitutionally protected and
could not be prosecuted”).
120 8 N.E.3d 308, 316 (N.Y. 2014).
121 Id.  The court added that “[h]ad there been only a few such deceptive assurances,”
they might be insufficient to render his statements coerced, but Thomas was told that he
would not be arrested and that he would be going home fourteen and eight times, respec-
tively. Id.  Moreover, Thomas is of limited usefulness because the court hinged its decision
on the combination of this ploy, along with a minimization ploy, a threat to arrest his wife,
and the medical ruse described below in the text accompanying notes 149–153. Thomas, 8
N.E.3d at 316.
122 923 P.2d 820, 831 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
123 See United States v. Burgess, 33 F. App’x 386, 389 (10th Cir. 2002) (no coercion
where officers “were vague and non-committal”).
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ter’ for [him] if he cooperated.”124  The Court of Appeals of Texas dis-
agreed, writing: “A ‘prediction about future events’ is not the same as a
‘promise.’”125  On the other hand, a promise by an officer “that he would
‘help [the suspect] in every way in the world’” was held to be coercive by the
Arkansas Supreme Court in Pyles v. State.126
It is true that a small number of courts have rejected the notion that a
false promise of leniency in exchange for a confession will invalidate the con-
fession.  But they have done so only by conflating false promises of leniency
with true promises of leniency—that is, those that are ultimately kept.  For
example, in State v. Marini, police induced a confession by telling the suspect
“that a confession would render him generally ‘better off’ and by informing
him that by confessing, ‘he could get some help and could even get [away
with] probation.’”127  Defendant was convicted of first-degree arson and sen-
tenced to twenty years in prison.128  The Rhode Island Supreme Court held
the tactic permissible: “A confession is not rendered involuntary . . . by law
enforcement officials promising a defendant, in exchange for a confession,
that they would reduce the charges; or that the defendant would receive
more lenient treatment.”129  Yet the two cases cited for these propositions
involved not false promises of leniency, but promises of leniency that the
state ultimately followed through on.130
124 116 S.W.3d 248, 260 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003).
125 Id. (quoting United States v. Fraction, 795 F.2d 12, 15 (3d Cir. 1986)); see also State
v. Bays, 716 N.E.2d 1126, 1137 (Ohio 1999) (merely informing suspect “of the penalties for
various degrees of homicide” was not a “promise of leniency”); State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930,
936 (Utah 1998) (finding “no express promise that [suspect’s] punishment would be
reduced if he confessed” where detective told him “[h]ow much time [you serve], is up to
you” (second and third alterations in original)); State v. Simmons, 944 S.W.2d 165, 175
(Mo. 1997) (en banc) (rejecting claim of coercion by capital defendant where detectives
told suspect he faced the death penalty “and that it would be better for him if he told the
truth”); State v. Thaggard, 527 N.W.2d 804, 811–12 (Minn. 1995) (rejecting claim that
defendant was duped into thinking he would receive drug treatment instead of, rather
than in addition to, being prosecuted); Kennedy v. State, 641 So. 2d 135, 137 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1994) (officer did not promise immunity merely by mentioning it, and then clarified
that he was not authorized to grant immunity); State v. Sanford, 569 So. 2d 147, 152 (La.
Ct. App. 1990) (“[A] promise by a police officer to communicate to the district attorney’s
office a defendant’s cooperation is not a sufficient inducement to render a subsequent
confession inadmissible.”).
126 947 S.W.2d 754, 755–57 (Ark. 1997); see also United States v. Lopez, 437 F.3d 1059,
1064–65 (10th Cir. 2006) (agent’s writing down numbers on sheets of paper indicating the
respective number of years of imprisonment suspect would receive if shooting was an acci-
dent rather than murder, along with statement about previous suspects receiving leniency
for confessing to accidental killings, constituted false promise of leniency).
127 638 A.2d 507, 512 (R.I. 1994) (alteration in original).
128 Id. at 518.
129 Id. at 513 (citations omitted).
130 See United States v. Harris, 914 F.2d 927, 933 (7th Cir. 1990) (“[T]he state mari-
juana charges stemming from [Harris’s] arrest were dropped, indicating that the govern-
ment lived up to the terms of any alleged deal to which Harris now objects.”); United
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A divided en banc U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit commit-
ted the same error in United States v. LeBrun.131  There, one interrogating
officer told the defendant that if the killing had been “spontaneous” rather
than premeditated “you will not be prosecuted,” to which the other officer
declared: “That’s absolutely right.”132  The court found the resulting confes-
sion noncoerced on the ground that “a promise made by law enforcement
‘does not render a confession involuntary per se.’”133  Yet the two cases the
court relied upon involved promises of leniency that were later kept.134
7. Deception About Matters Extrinsic to the Case
A final category encompasses deceptive interrogation practices regard-
ing facts extrinsic to the potential case against the suspect.135 Lynumn v.
Illinois,136 Rogers v. Richmond,137 and Spano v. New York138 might all fall into
this category. Lynumn involved a threat to have the suspect’s children taken
away.139 Rogers involved a threat to arrest the suspect’s wife.140  And Spano
involved a ruse that the suspect’s failure to talk would result in negative con-
sequences for Bruno, his childhood friend, and Bruno’s family.141  But, as
discussed, Lynumn and Rogers are of limited usefulness because it is unclear
whether they even involved deception,142 and Spano’s utility is limited for
other reasons.143
States v. Guarno, 819 F.2d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 1987)  (“[A] confession made pursuant to a
cooperation agreement is not the product of coercion.”).
131 363 F.3d 715 (8th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
132 Id. at 725.
133 Id. (quoting Simmons v. Bowersox, 235 F.3d 1134, 1133 (8th Cir. 2001)).
134 See United States v. Larry, 126 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam)
(“[P]olice . . . told Larry he would be released from jail and not prosecuted for the drive-by
shooting if he told them what he knew about the shooting. . . . As promised, Larry was then
released and was not prosecuted on the felony charges.”); Tippitt v. Lockhart, 859 F.2d
595, 598 (8th Cir. 1988) (“[P]etitioner’s statement was given in exchange for a promise by
the officers not to charge him with capital felony murder . . . . This promise was fulfilled.”).
135 See State v. Kelekolio, 849 P.2d 58, 73 (Haw. 1993) (determining in dicta that
“employment by the police of deliberate falsehoods intrinsic to the facts of the alleged
offense” are subject to the usual “totality of circumstances” test, while “deliberate false-
hoods extrinsic to the facts of the alleged offense, which are of a type reasonably likely to
procure an untrue statement . . . will be regarded as coercive per se”); see also United States
v. Beaver, No. 08-CR-016, 2008 WL 2510014, at *8 (E.D. Okla. June 18, 2008) (expressing
agreement with Kelekolio); Sheriff, Washoe Cty. v. Bessey, 914 P.2d 618, 620–21 (Nev. 1996)
(same).
136 372 U.S. 528, 531–34 (1963).
137 365 U.S. 534, 535 (1961).
138 360 U.S. 315, 323 (1959).
139 See supra text accompanying note 24.
140 See supra text accompanying notes 22–23.
141 See supra text accompanying notes 9–12.
142 See supra text accompanying notes 27–32.
143 See supra text accompanying notes 13–14.
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A recent New York case provides a good example of limits on police
deception about matters extrinsic to the interrogation room.  In People v.
Thomas, the suspect confessed to slamming his infant son violently into a mat-
tress, mortally wounding him, after police used four arguably deceptive tac-
tics.144  First, the police employed minimization by assuring him “67 times
that what [he had] done to his son was an accident.”145  Second, they
implied leniency by telling him “14 times that he would not be arrested, and
eight times that he would be going home.”146  Third, the police threatened
falsely to arrest Thomas’s wife.147  Finally, the police convinced Thomas that
they needed to know exactly how he injured his child in order for the doctors
to save his life, when they knew that the child was already brain dead.148
The court held that this combination of techniques rendered his confes-
sion coerced,149 but it did not disentangle the different strands of coercion
and deception.  Based on prevailing caselaw, the minimization technique did
not render his confession coerced, while the deceptive suggestions that
Thomas would not be arrested arguably were promises of leniency that ren-
dered his confession invalid.  And although the court deemed the threat to
arrest Thomas’s wife a “deception,” its reasoning shows that the court would
have determined this ploy to be coercive even if it had been true.  It relied on
Garrity v. New Jersey150 for the proposition that “interrogators may not
threaten that the assertion of Fifth Amendment rights will result in harm to
the interrogee’s vital interests.”151  But in Garrity, the threat, that those assert-
ing their Fifth Amendment privilege would lose their jobs, was all too real.
Thus, the coerciveness vel non of this type of threat does not depend on
whether it is idle or real.
The distinctive deception that appears in Thomas was the medical ruse:
the false statement that Thomas’s confession was needed to save his son’s life,
even though police knew the son was already brain dead.  What is distinctive
here is that the supposed consequence of Thomas’s failure to talk was outside
the control of the State; it was not that state actors would do or fail to do
something if Thomas refused to speak, but that adverse consequences would
result in some way independent of the State.  The court wrote that these
deceptions were “representations of a sort that would prompt any ordinarily
caring parent to provide whatever information they thought might be help-
ful, even if it was incriminating.”152  It concluded that the “falsehoods were
144 8 N.E.3d 308, 309, 311, 314–16 (N.Y. 2014).
145 Id. at 316.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 311.
148 Id. at 311, 314–15.
149 Id. at 316.
150 385 U.S. 493, 497–98 (1967).
151 Thomas, 8 N.E.3d at 314 (citing Garrity, 385 U.S. at 493).
152 Id. at 315.
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coercive by making defendant’s constitutionally protected option to remain
silent seem valueless.”153
8. Summary
In sum, courts take a largely permissive approach to the use of police
deception to induce confessions.  Although some have drawn the line at
fabricated evidence, this is a minority position, and all seem to agree that
verbal deception about the existence of independent evidence of guilt is
acceptable.  Courts seem to agree on only three types of deception that will
render a resulting confession coerced: promises of leniency, distortion or
contradiction of the Miranda warnings, and, sometimes, as in the Thomas
case, deception about matters outside the interrogation room about which
the suspect has a strong interest.  Absent from the cases, however, is any
explanatory theory as to why some deception is forbidden while most is per-
mitted.  Rather, the cases typically articulate something like this unhelpful
dictum from the New Mexico Supreme Court: “There is certainly a point at
which police threats, promises, or deception, would cross the line into coer-
cion, but that line has not been crossed here.”154  This lack of any explana-
tory theory is replicated by the scholarship on the subject, which is generally
long on proposals to either limit or permit police deception during interro-
gation but short on any attempt to understand the status quo.
II. SCHOLARLY CRITIQUES OF DECEPTIVE INTERROGATION PRACTICES
While some scholarly commentary on the constitutional standards gov-
erning police deception during interrogation defends the status quo, most
recommends a more extensive, or even complete, ban on police decep-
tion.155  With a few exceptions, the scholarship on both sides tends to suffer
from several drawbacks.  First, it typically fails to offer any explanatory
153 Id.
154 State v. Evans, 210 P.3d 216, 226 (N.M. 2009); see also Martin v. State, 107 So.3d 281,
298 (Fla. 2012) (rejecting defendant’s claim that his confession was coerced, pointing to
six very different types of pressure and deception, but “not[ing] that this case presents the
very outer limit as to what tactics law enforcement may employ when performing a custo-
dial interrogation”); State v. Thaggard, 527 N.W.2d 804, 810–11 (Minn. 1995) (holding
confession not coerced but “caution[ing] police that they proceed on thin ice and at their
own risk when they use deception of the sort used in this case”).
155 I put to one side the scholarship that has made prescriptions explicitly on policy
grounds rather than on constitutional grounds. See Jacobi, supra note 6, at 73 (calling for a
“comprehensive review of police practices” through “legislative or administrative over-
sight”); Khasin, supra note 6, at 1032 (advocating “the creation of a new legislative frame-
work” for regulating police deception during interrogations); Paris, supra note 6, at 7–8
(focusing on the “advisability” of rules restricting police deception rather than any consti-
tutional basis for such rules); Roppé, supra note 6, at 768–69 (calling upon Congress to
constrain police deception during interrogation).  This Article attempts to distill and jus-
tify a constitutional rule on police use of deception during interrogation.  Whether and to
what extent such deception should be forbidden as a matter of policy is beyond the scope
of this Article.
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account of the law as it has developed.  While prescriptive scholarship is obvi-
ously useful, the first step in the scholarly endeavor ought to be an attempt to
understand why the law is what it is.  Only then can the law be helpfully
critiqued.  Second, much of the scholarship focuses on the problem of false
confessions and consequent false convictions, and the use of constitutional
rules and standards to minimize conviction of the innocent.  Laudable a goal
as this is, it imputes to the constitutional provisions governing this area, the
Self-Incrimination Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause, an overriding concern about the reliability of confessions induced by
police interrogation.  But this focus is sharply at odds with the Supreme
Court precedent in this area, which relegates reliability of confessions to sec-
ondary importance, at best.  Finally, calls for bans or extensive constraints on
police deception generally are stated fairly amorphously and fail to come to
terms with serious problems of administrability of their proposed rules or
standards.
A. Proposals for a More Extensive Ban on Police Deception
Calls for a more extensive ban on police deception generally do not
make any attempt to understand current doctrine but instead skip directly
toward prescriptive efforts.  More problematically, many such calls misat-
tribute the rationale for constraints on interrogation tactics to the prevention
of false confessions, which is at best an ancillary concern of constitutional
doctrine as it has developed.  In addition, more extensive bans on police
deception would encounter serious administrability problems, given that all
interrogations involve some form of deception, whether express or implicit,
subtle or profound, affirmative or by omission.
Some advocates of a more extensive constitutional ban on police decep-
tion place a heavy, sometimes exclusive, reliance on a reliability rationale for
constitutional constraints on interrogation practices.  One commentator, for
example, broadly advocated a rule prohibiting “intentionally false representa-
tions by law enforcement about such matters as the presence or strength of
forensic evidence, incriminating statements by eyewitnesses or alleged
accomplices, and whether the defendant was led to believe that he was being
questioned merely as a witness rather than as a suspect.”156  The primary
rationale behind this recommendation is that “law enforcement trickery pro-
duce[s] false confessions.”157  Another commentator likewise recommended
“a bright line rule prohibiting all police lying,”158 driven largely by the con-
cern that police lying induces false confessions.159  And some more surgical
approaches, advocating greater constraints on certain types of police decep-
156 Gohara, supra note 6, at 838.
157 Id. at 834.
158 Young, supra note 6, at 477 (footnote omitted).
159 Id. at 461–63; see also Hritz, supra note 6, at 502, 505 (mentioning that “police lies
are likely to encourage an innocent person to confess” as a reason for a blanket ban on
police deception but relying primarily on the harm that deception does to the suspect’s
ability to accurately gauge his interests).
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tion without calling for a total ban, also rely on the premise that avoidance of
false confessions drives the doctrine.160
But the Supreme Court has said just the opposite on many occasions.  As
early as 1941, for example, in Lisenba v. California, the Court said that “[t]he
aim of the requirement of due process is not to exclude presumptively false
evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence,
whether true or false.”161  The question is not whether the statements are
reliable but rather whether they were made as “the result of the deprivation
of [the suspect’s] free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer.”162
Soon enough, the Court began asking in every case whether the suspect’s
“will was overborne.”163  In Rogers v. Richmond, it sharply refuted the notion
that reliability drives due process constraints on interrogation practices: “To
be sure, confessions cruelly extorted may be and have been, to an unascer-
tained extent, found to be untrustworthy.  But the constitutional principle of
excluding confessions that are not voluntary does not rest on this considera-
tion.”164  Indeed, the Rogers Court ordered the granting of habeas corpus
relief, not because it found the confession to have been coerced but because
the state courts had addressed the coercion issue only by reference to
whether the resulting confession was reliable, and therefore never truly
answered the only constitutional question that mattered: whether Rogers’s
will had been overborne.165
The post-Miranda Court has continued to posit that reliability enhance-
ment is not the primary goal of the due process constraint on interrogation
tactics.  In Colorado v. Connelly, relying upon the language from Lisebna
quoted above, the Court wrote that a statement made by a suspect suffering
from a mental illness “might be proved to be quite unreliable, but this is a
160 See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 6, at 974 (advocating bar on “falsifying incriminating
evidence and misrepresenting the strength of the evidence against a suspect,” largely
because such falsehoods are “likely to generate false confessions”); Kitai-Sangero, supra
note 6, at 630–43 (advocating ban on police use of false evidence, in part because of the
risk of false confessions); Reed, supra note 6, at 756–57 (advocating that use of falsified
DNA evidence be banned because it is particularly likely to induce false confessions);
Thomas, supra note 6, at 1168–69 (advocating a complete ban on police use of false evi-
dence because such “trickery has its harshest effect upon innocent persons”); White,
Miranda’s Failure, supra note 6, at 1235 (positing that the “underlying purpose” of con-
straints on interrogation is to ban tactics “that are substantially likely to produce untrust-
worthy confessions”); Wynbrandt, supra note 6, at 552–53, 558–59 (advocating for limits on
police use of false evidence based on the danger of false confessions).
161 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).  This it contrasted with subconstitutional rules of evidence
that required that statements be voluntary, which are motivated by reliability concerns.  See
id. (“The aim of the rule that a confession is inadmissible unless it was voluntarily made is
to exclude false evidence.”).
162 Id. at 241.
163 See, e.g., Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 440 (1961).
164 365 U.S. 534, 540–41 (1961).
165 Id. at 544–45; see also supra text accompanying notes 29–32.
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matter to be governed by the evidentiary laws of the forum, and not by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”166
Nor does the reliability-enhancing rationale do much work if the focus is
not on the Due Process Clause but on the Self-Incrimination Clause.  Once
again, here the Court has spoken quite plainly that reliability is not the only,
or even the primary, rationale underlying the Clause.  It famously set out a
laundry list of such rationales in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York
Harbor:
The privilege against self-incrimination . . . reflects many of our funda-
mental values and most noble aspirations: our unwillingness to subject those
suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or con-
tempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system
of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited
by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates “a
fair state-individual balance by requiring the government to leave the indi-
vidual alone until good cause is shown for disturbing him and by requiring
the government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire
load”; our respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the
right of each individual “to a private enclave where he may lead a private
life”; our distrust of self-deprecatory statements; and our realization that the
privilege, while sometimes “a shelter to the guilty,” is often “a protection to
the innocent.”167
Thus, in laying out seven different rationales underlying the Clause, the
Court did not even mention reliability until number six—a “distrust of self-
deprecatory statements.”  While the argument can be made that reliability
ought to be considered the touchstone of the Self-Incrimination Clause,168
166 Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986) (citation omitted); see also Joseph D.
Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REV. 859, 919–20 (1979)
(arguing that trustworthiness of evidence is not the primary underlying concern of
coerced-confessions jurisprudence); Heyl, supra note 6, at 938 (“Connelly held that the
unreliability of the confession was not a matter of constitutional concern . . . .”); Yale
Kamisar, Response, On the “Fruits” of Miranda Violations, Coerced Confessions, and Compelled
Testimony, 93 MICH. L. REV. 929, 938 (1995) (“Untrustworthiness is no longer the sole, or
even the principal, reason for excluding coerced or involuntary confessions.”); Charles J.
Ogletree, Jr., Comment, Arizona v. Fulminante: The Harm of Applying Harmless Error to
Coerced Confessions, 105 HARV. L. REV. 152, 168–70 (1991) (arguing that reliability is of sec-
ondary importance to more deeply-rooted notions of justice embodied by rule against
coerced confessions); Roppé, supra note 6, at 757 (“Although the unreliability of coerced
confessions constitutes an important concern of the justice system, the constitutional prin-
ciple which dictates exclusion of such confessions is rooted in fairness, which stems from
the due process clauses . . . .”); White, Police Trickery, supra note 6, at 583 (“[T]he Court’s
voluntariness standard does not focus solely on the reliability of a particular
confession . . . .”).
167 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (citations omitted).
168 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar & Renée B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The
Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 895 (1995).
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many—and, most importantly, the Supreme Court—have not been
convinced.169
That the Self-Incrimination Clause prevents even reliable evidence of
guilt being forcibly disclosed from the lips of the suspect shows that the
Clause primarily protects the guilty, not the innocent.  As Professor William
Stuntz wrote, “the privilege against self-incrimination . . . cannot be charac-
terized as a device for protecting the innocent.  On the contrary, the privi-
lege’s clear purpose is to protect people who are guilty from having to
disclose their guilt.”170
People v. Thomas provides solid evidence that constitutional constraints
on confessions are not there to protect the innocent.  The ruse there, falsely
telling the suspect that his information was needed to save his infant son’s
life, would not have created any unfair pressure on an innocent person to
confess.  Police were not looking merely for a bare admission of guilt but for
detailed evidence on how the crime was committed.  An innocent person
faced with this imperative could have not provided helpful information and
likely would have believed that any false information he provided would do
more harm than good.  He thus would not have experienced the dilemma
felt by Thomas: condemn himself to prison and save his son’s life, or stand by
his rights and let his son die.  Indeed, the State defended the ploy in the New
York Court of Appeals on the ground that it occasioned “no substantial risk
[it] would elicit a false confession.”171  The Thomas court rejected this argu-
ment, not because it was not true, but because, based on Rogers v. Richmond, it
was beside the point.172  The court’s ruling that the medical ruse was imper-
missible helps only the guilty.173
Some commentators have posited other reasons for barring all or nearly
all police deception during interrogation.  They assert that lying by police
harms the integrity of the criminal justice system.174  Some go further and
claim that police deception breeds distrust of the police, leading to reticence
on the part of citizenry to cooperate in investigations, and ultimately result-
169 See, e.g., Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 692 (1993) (reproducing the passage
from Murphy); see also Mark A. Godsey, Rethinking the Involuntary Confession Rule: Toward a
Workable Test for Identifying Compelled Self-Incrimination, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 465, 484 (2005)
(“The historical data simply does not support the notion of the self-incrimination clause as
a gatekeeping mechanism to further the truth-seeking function of criminal trials by ban-
ning all unreliable statements regardless of how or by whom the statements were
induced.”).
170 Stuntz, supra note 6, at 766; accord Mosteller, supra note 41, at 835–36 (“It is exceed-
ingly difficult to argue that the benefits of the procedurally-oriented Fifth Amendment
right against compulsory incrimination . . . were intended to be generally restricted to the
innocent.”).
171 People v. Thomas, 8 N.E.3d 308, 315 (N.Y. 2014).
172 Id. at 315–16.
173 See Heyl, supra note 6, at 949 (observing that whether “a medical ruse could lead to
the truth . . . is irrelevant under the Due Process Clause”).
174 Alschuler, supra note 6, at 974–75; Gohara, supra note 6, at 831; Hamblet, supra
note 6, at 145–46; Kitai-Sangero, supra note 6, at 624–28; Young, supra note 6, at 468–71.
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ing in a net reduction in evidence collection.175  Finally, some warn, as the
Florida and New Jersey courts have,176 that deception in the interrogation
room could lead to deception in other fora, such as the courtroom.177
Granted, these are all legitimate policy concerns.  But none is the goal of
constitutional constraints on interrogation.  Again, the primary goal of the
due process constraint is to ensure that any resulting statement is the product
of the suspect’s free will.  And the goals of the Self-Incrimination Clause,
according to Murphy,178 are manifold, but the Clause is still not capacious
enough to accommodate general system integrity, avoidance of police per-
jury, or concerns about loss of valuable evidence.179  There may or may not
be good policy reasons to limit or even prohibit police deception during
interrogations.  But good policy is not the same as constitutional mandate.
Other advocates of more extensive bans on police deception avoid these
flaws.  However, their proposals tend to suffer from serious deficits of
administrability.  Virtually all police interrogation involves some modicum of
deceit.180  It is almost never in the suspect’s best interest to provide the
police with self-incriminating evidence unless he is providing it for a price.
By providing the police with information for “free,”181 he is almost necessa-
rily acting irrationally and against his interest.  But then virtually all interro-
gation, premised as it is on the implicit assumption that confession can help
the suspect in some way, is deceptive.182  For example, Professor Welsh White
suggested that it should be impermissible for the police to “verbally impress
upon the suspect that it is really in his own best interest for him to talk”
because it “indirectly distort[s] the Miranda warnings” that speaking is decid-
edly not in the suspect’s own best interest.183  But if that implicit distortion is
recognized as improper, so too would even conducting the interrogation at
all, which implicitly sends the same signal.
Even beyond that, some proposals of extensive bans on police deception
create intractable line-drawing problems.184  If only “certain false evidence
175 Reed, supra note 6, at 760; Young, supra note 6, at 457–61.
176 See supra text accompanying notes 84–88.
177 Reed, supra note 6, at 760; Young, supra note 6, 463–66.
178 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964); see text
accompanying note 167.
179 Indeed, if legislators or police officials determine that police deception leads to a
net reduction in evidence, and therefore fewer convictions, they have every motivation to
curtail the practice, and so no constitutional bar is necessary. See Stuntz, supra note 6, at
825.
180 Leo, supra note 3, at 43 (“Deceit is inherent in every question asked to the suspect,
and in every statement made by the interrogator.” (quoting FRED E. INBAU & JOHN E. REID,
CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 96 (1st ed. 1962))).
181 Stuntz, supra note 6, at 776–77.
182 Magid, supra note 6, at 1168 (“At the very least, the successful interrogator deceives
the suspect by allowing the suspect to believe that it somehow will be in the suspect’s best
interest to undertake the almost always self-defeating course of confessing.”).
183 White, Police Trickery, supra note 6, at 610.
184 George C. Thomas III, Regulating Police Deception During Interrogation, 39 TEX. TECH
L. REV. 1293, 1296 (2007) (“[T]he deception line is difficult to draw.”).
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ploys tip the scales too strongly,” courts are left attempting to draw the line
between “more and less coercive forms of lies.”185  Professor White proposed
limits on the false evidence ploy based on a malleable, multifactor test that
looks at “the type of evidence misrepresented, the nature and quality of the
misrepresentation, the extent to which the misrepresented evidence seems to
establish the suspect’s guilt, and the suspect’s apparent vulnerability.”186  As
Professor White himself conceded, such a test could “prove difficult to
apply.”187
One might go further and forbid any statement or conduct by the police
that expresses empathy toward the suspect,188 with an eye toward the most
profound forms of this tactic: say, the police assuming the role of “father
figure” or “religious counsellor.”189  But what about simple and fleeting kind
words by the officer about the suspect’s plight?  What about a gratuitous offer
of food and drink?  Indeed, what about a sympathetic look?190  And if these
line-drawing concerns are implicated even by Professor White’s broad but
more surgical approach to police lying,191 it is necessarily true with regard to
blunter attacks on police deception.192
B. Defense of the Status Quo
By now, advocates of the status quo might be cheering.  Not so fast.
Many defenses of the status quo suffer some of the same flaws identified in
their adversaries’ position.
Only a handful of scholars have defended the current, mostly hands-off
approach to deceptive interrogation practices.  Most notably, Laurie Magid
has advanced this position.193  Magid’s premise was that ensuring the reliabil-
ity of confessions is the strongest rationale for the proscription against coer-
185 Wynbrandt, supra note 6, at 557, 559.
186 White, Miranda’s Failure, supra note 6, at 1243.
187 Id. at 1245.
188 See, e.g., Hamblet, supra note 6, at 125 (“The use of the feigned empathy technique
should be considered constitutionally suspect . . . .”); Sasaki, supra note 6, at 1595, 1600
(advocating a ban on any “technique that takes unfair advantage of the defendant’s emo-
tions”); White, Police Trickery, supra note 6, at 617 (“[T]he device of seeking to elicit incrim-
inating information through the assumption of a non-adversarial role should be barred.”
(footnote omitted)).
189 White, Police Trickery, supra note 6, at 615 (citing cases).
190 Kitai-Sangero, supra note 6, at 616 (“[I]t is difficult to prohibit a lie that is reflected
in a smile and gestures of friendship toward the suspect, such as offering a cup of coffee or
a cigarette . . . .”).
191 White, Police Trickery, supra note 6, at 601–28 (discussing seven specific types of
police deception that should be barred).
192 See, e.g., Hritz, supra note 6, at 502 (“[P]olice must never lie unless no truthful, non-
coercive alternatives are available.”).
193 See generally Magid, supra note 6.  To the same effect, see generally Shealy, supra
note 6.
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cive tactics in the interrogation room.194  Given this rationale, the best
standard governing interrogation tactics is “whether the procedure used to
obtain a confession creates an unreasonable risk that an innocent person
would falsely confess.”195  She acknowledged that deceptive techniques
might sometimes result in false confessions and, consequently, false convic-
tions.196  But she identified several flaws in the research on whether and to
what extent this occurs, concluding that it is entirely unknown whether false
confessions occur in substantial enough numbers to warrant reform of inter-
rogation practices.197  At the same time, she argued that deceptive tactics are
very useful to the police in obtaining true confessions.198  She concluded
that no one has yet shown that the costs of deceptive interrogation practices
outweigh their benefits.199
Magid’s challenge to researchers on false confessions is well taken.  If
the role of coerced-confessions jurisprudence is to optimize the number of
reliable confessions, one would need to have not only reliable evidence on
the causal relationship between deception and false confessions; one would
also need a good sense of the relative numbers of both true and false confes-
sions induced by deception.  After all, the goal of optimizing the number of
true confessions is not the same goal as minimizing the number of false ones,
any more than optimizing the number of guilty people convicted is the same
as minimizing the number of innocent people convicted.  The latter might
be achieved by implementing a “beyond all doubt” standard at criminal trials,
but no one would argue that such a standard is constitutionally required or
even a good idea.  Just as the “beyond a reasonable doubt standard” all but
ensures that some innocents will be convicted, a laissez-faire attitude toward
police deception all but ensures that some false confessions will be elicited.
But, as Magid wisely points out, there is no way of knowing without better
evidence whether the optimal number of true confessions is reached under
the status quo.
The main flaw in Magid’s analysis occurs much earlier: in her premise
that the primary goal of our coerced-confessions jurisprudence is to ensure
the reliability of confessions.  But, as already demonstrated, constitutional
194 Magid, supra note 6, at 1177–78 (“[T]he reliability concern provides the most con-
sistent, and appropriate, explanation for the Court’s voluntariness decisions.”); accord FRED
E. INBAU, JOHN E. REID, JOSEPH P. BUCKLEY & BRIAN C. JAYNE, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND
CONFESSIONS 486 (4th ed. 2001) (“The trickery or deceit must not be of such a nature as
to . . . induce a false confession.”).
195 Magid, supra note 6, at 1187.
196 Id. at 1192 (“At best, the existing research has shown . . . that certain interrogation
techniques are more likely than other techniques to result in false confession . . . .”).
197 Id. at 1187–98.
198 Id. at 1197–1200; see also Jacobi, supra note 6, at 72 (“Deception is an essential inter-
rogation tool for playing on consciousness of guilt of guilty suspects.” (footnote omitted)).
199 Magid, supra note 6, at 1206–07; see also Jacobi, supra note 6, at 72 (“The psychologi-
cal studies raise important and very concerning results regarding false confessions, but
simply concluding that all police deception should be prohibited ignores countervailing
considerations.”).
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constraints on interrogation are not driven solely or even primarily by the
goal of preventing false confessions.200
A second flaw in defenses of the status quo is that they fail to explain why
courts deem some deception off limits.  Taken to its logical extreme, the
position that deception should be permitted because no one has yet shown
that its costs outweigh its benefits would seem to permit all police deception
during interrogations.  Yet, as discussed above, courts agree that some types
of deception do cross the line.
Magid would allow that some deception, such as impersonation of a
member of the clergy by a police officer, would “shock the conscience” and
“should be barred because it intrudes on society’s fundamental value in relig-
ion.”201  The “shocks the conscience” standard is a notoriously flabby one,202
as is any that focuses on society’s “fundamental value[s]” (why, one might
ask, is our trust in the police not a “fundamental value?”).  But more impor-
tantly, this single caveat does not explain the jurisprudence, which generally
does not use a “shocks the conscience” standard to determine when police
deception goes too far.203  She also does not claim that false promises of
leniency and distortions of the Miranda warnings, which courts have held off
limits, are conscience-shocking.  Regardless of whether it is a valid normative
claim that only (and all) “conscience-shocking” deception should be out-
lawed, it does not have much descriptive value.204
200 See supra text accompanying notes 166–77; see also White, Miranda’s Failure, supra
note 6, at 1222 (“In view of Miranda’s holding that the Fifth Amendment privilege applies
to custodial interrogation, Magid’s claim that the prevention of unreliable confessions is
the sole (or primary) basis for prohibiting interrogation practices cannot be correct.”
(footnote omitted)).
201 Magid, supra note 6, at 1208; accord INBAU ET AL., supra note 194, at 486–87 (conced-
ing that these tactics “shock the conscience of the . . . community” and therefore are
impermissible); Brian C. Jayne & Joseph P. Buckley, Criminal Interrogation Techniques on
Trial, PROSECUTOR J. NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N, Fall 1991, at 23, 23 (same).
202 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 861 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment) (citing COLE PORTER, You’re the Top, on ANYTHING GOES (Victor Records
1934)) (deriding the “shocks-the-conscience” test as “the ne plus ultra, the Napoleon
Brandy, the Mahatma Gandhi, the Cellophane of subjectivity” (footnote omitted)).
203 That standard was endorsed by a majority of the Supreme Court in only one
coerced confession case, Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003), which involved a claim of
true coercion, not deception, id. at 764, 774–75 (plurality opinion of Thomas, J., joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., & Scalia, J.) (addressing claim that emergency room interrogation of arres-
tee suffering grievous physical injuries violated due process on the ground that it shocked
the conscience); id. at 779 (Souter, J., joined by Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment)
(appearing to agree with applicability of the “shocks the conscience” standard); id. at 787
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (same).  Moreover, in that case, the
Court was confronted with an unusual procedural posture: the interrogee there had never
been prosecuted; instead, he sued the police for coercively interrogating him. Id. at
764–65 (plurality opinion).  It may be that the “shocks the conscience” standard applies
only in such a case, while the “overborne will” standard applies when putatively coerced
statements are actually used against their maker.
204 Likewise, Shealy, supra note 6, at 46, acknowledges, and appears to agree with,
caselaw that holds that “extreme deceit designed to trick one into giving up one’s constitu-
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Professor Christopher Slobogin, by contrast, has attempted to explain
and justify current doctrine,205 and he has come close to doing so.  He cor-
rectly recognizes that neither the Due Process voluntariness analysis nor the
Self-Incrimination concept of compulsion are driven by the reliability vel non
of the resulting confession.206  Given this, he explains current doctrine via
what he calls the “equivalency rule”: “[O]nce the warnings are given and
acknowledged as understood, police deception during interrogation
amounts to Fifth Amendment coercion when, but only when, the deceptive
statements would be coercive if true.”207  Under this principle, Professor
Slobogin argues, police deception that amounts to “negotiation”—promising
or strongly suggesting leniency in exchange for a confession—is impermissi-
bly coercive.208  However, “impersonation” (deception about whether an offi-
cial interrogation is even occurring), “rationalization” (including
minimization and expressions of sympathy), and fabrication of evidence are
noncoercive under the equivalency rule.209
Professor Slobogin’s “equivalency rule” gets it mostly right.  This is
because coercion is viewed from the point of view of the suspect.210  Thus, a
statement is equally coercive or noncoercive, irrespective of its truth, so long
as the suspect believes it to be true.  To take an obvious example, a gun held
to the suspect’s head is equally coercive irrespective of whether it is loaded or
empty, and irrespective of whether the officer holding it really intends to pull
the trigger if no confession is forthcoming or is merely bluffing.211  This is
perhaps why the Court in Lynumn and Rogers, involving threats to take the
suspect’s children away and to have the suspect’s wife brought in for ques-
tioning, respectively, did not stop to consider whether the threats were
idle212: either way, they were coercive.  Accordingly, the “equivalency rule” is
tional right not to speak” is impermissible.  However, he makes no attempt to explain what
makes some deceit “extreme,” or why lies about incriminating evidence are not extreme
while falsely telling the suspect that information is needed to save his infant son’s life is.  As
it turns out, Magid’s instincts on the police-as-chaplain stratagem are correct, but not for
the reason she provided. See infra text accompanying notes 193–200.
205 Slobogin, supra note 6, at 1164 (explaining that his “goal . . . is to make sense of
current doctrine, not change it”).
206 Id. at 1177–80.
207 Id. at 1167; see also Christopher Slobogin, Lying and Confessing, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV.
1275, 1276 (2007).  Professor Slobogin also would deem impermissible “lies aimed at con-
vincing suspects that they do not have a right to remain silent or a right to counsel.” Id.
This constraint is fairly noncontroversial.
208 Slobogin, supra note 6, at 1168–71.
209 Id. at 1171–73.
210 Stuntz, supra note 6, at 807 (“[T]he key to a descriptive theory of the privilege is
how the choice appears to the suspect, not how it appears from some omniscient perspec-
tive.”); see also Sasaki, supra note 6, at 1606 (“When voluntariness is made the fulcrum of
analysis of a suspect’s rights, then police misconduct of which the suspect is not aware is
not subject to regulation.”).
211 Slobogin, supra note 207, at 1287 (“A threat to beat a suspect who is not talking . . .
is impermissibly coercive, whether the threat is real or not.”).
212 See supra text accompanying notes 22–32.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-2\NDL207.txt unknown Seq: 35 10-DEC-20 10:28
2020] fraudulently  induced  confessions 833
an appealing way of describing and justifying some existing caselaw and is a
good starting point.
However, the equivalency rule does not explain certain aspects of cur-
rent law.  For example, it does not explain Thomas.  Imagine that the infor-
mation provided to Thomas was actually true, that doctors really did need to
know how his infant son was injured in order to save his life.  Assuming
Thomas was guilty, he had a difficult choice to make: forgo his privilege
against self-incrimination and face many years in prison in order to save his
son’s life, or stand by the privilege and let his son die.  But the Constitution
typically does not forbid the State from presenting people with the difficult
choice between exercising a constitutional right and suffering adverse conse-
quences from its exercise, on the one hand, and forgoing the right in order
to avoid those consequences, on the other.213  It merely prevents the State
from creating those adverse consequences—altering the “suspect’s status quo
to her detriment”214—in a way that specifically targets the exercise of a con-
stitutional right.  As Professor Kent Greenawalt has written: “[T]he moral
right to silence should not be viewed as a right to be released from all the
normal influences to respond to accusations.  Rather, it should be viewed as a
right to be free of the especially powerful compulsions that the state can
bring to bear on witnesses.”215  Thomas’s son’s dire condition, had it actually
existed, would have been one of “the normal influences” on Thomas to
speak, part of his “status quo.”
Thus, truthfully informing Thomas that only he could provide life-saving
information for his son would not have been coercive.  The State would not
have been creating a penalty for the exercise of Thomas’s constitutional
rights by altering his status quo, as it arguably did when the police threatened
to arrest his wife.  Because police nearly always have discretion whether to
arrest, such a threat might have been, in effect, the creation of a penalty that
did not otherwise exist.216  Not so if they had simply relayed truthful informa-
213 See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 213 (1971) (“Although a defendant may
have a right, even of constitutional dimensions, to follow whichever course he chooses, the
Constitution does not by that token always forbid requiring him to choose.”).
214 Godsey, supra note 169, at 525 (“The relevant question for the Court to ask is
whether . . . a reasonable person would objectively conclude that the interrogating officer
acted in such a way as to punish silence or provoke speech by changing the suspect’s status
quo to her detriment.”).
215 R. Kent Greenawalt, Silence as a Moral and Constitutional Right, 23 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 15, 40 (1981).
216 This is a contestable proposition. See Dix, supra note 21, at 251 (“Perhaps the great-
est uncertainty in this area concerns the effect of a showing that the defendant’s belief that
failure to waive would result in an unfavorable exercise of official discretion influenced his
decision, especially if the behavior of government agents created or reinforced that
belief.”).  But the question there has nothing to do with deception; it is whether the threat
was coercive irrespective of whether it was a true threat or an idle one. See Godsey, supra
note 169, at 532 (asserting that the question is whether “a reasonable [police] officer,
based on reasonable law enforcement practices, norms, and customs and societal expecta-
tions, would probably [have made the arrest] were it not for his desire to obtain a
confession”).
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tion that might have affected his decision whether to speak.  Indeed, the
Thomas court suggested as much, opining: “Perhaps speaking in such a cir-
cumstance would amount to a valid waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege
if the underlying representations were true . . . .”217  The decision in Thomas
turns on the fact that the information was false.218
The “equivalency rule” also does not explain the general judicial disap-
proval of a more common tactic: false promises of leniency.  Again, assume
that a promise of leniency is true.  That is, assume that the police have both
the power to determine what charges will be brought against the suspect219
and the intention of following through on a promise, say, to charge a defen-
dant with manslaughter rather than murder, or to charge only one rather
than multiple counts of narcotics distribution.  Assume further that the sus-
pect confesses in reliance on the promise.  Finally, assume that the promise
of leniency is then kept.
This process looks very much like plea bargaining, which the Supreme
Court has deemed noncoercive220 and which is both commonplace and a
virtual necessity in our criminal justice systems.221  Professor Slobogin antici-
pated this potential criticism of deeming interrogation-room negotiation
coercive222 and responded in two ways.  First, he argued, “the legality of plea
bargaining is dependent on the participation of counsel.”223  For support, he
217 People v. Thomas, 8 N.E.3d 308, 315 (N.Y. 2014).
218 See Heyl, supra note 6, at 948 (“[T]he deception [in Thomas] is the key
difference . . . .”).
219 But see Godsey, supra note 169, at 535 (“[I]t is a fairly universal practice in the
United States that law enforcement officers do not have the authority to plea bargain with
suspects regarding charging and sentencing issues during interrogations.”).
220 Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971).
221 Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012) (“[C]riminal justice today is for the most
part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.  Ninety-seven percent of federal convictions
and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.”).
222 Slobogin, supra note 6, at 1170 (citing Albert W. Alschuler, Miranda’s Fourfold Fail-
ure, 97 B.U. L. REV. 849, 863 (2017) (equating, for constitutional purposes, bona fide
promises of leniency for purposes of plea bargaining and the same tactic in the interroga-
tion room); Lawrence Rosenthal, Against Orthodoxy: Miranda Is Not Prophylactic and the Con-
stitution Is Not Perfect, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 579, 600–01 (2007) (similar)); see also Slobogin,
supra note 207, at 1287 (conceding that “false promises of leniency” are “[m]ore difficult
to analyze under the equivalency rule”).
223 Slobogin, supra note 6, at 1171.  As Professor White put it: “Since a defendant who
enters a guilty plea is entitled to be represented by counsel, the police arguably should be
prohibited from engaging in negotiations at an earlier stage of the proceedings to induce
what is tantamount to a guilty plea from an unrepresented suspect.”  Welsh S. White, Con-
fessions Induced by Broken Government Promises, 43 DUKE L.J. 947, 954 (1994).  The flaw in this
argument is that the suspect subjected to custodial interrogation also “is entitled to be
represented by counsel” and has been explicitly told of this entitlement.  One potential
response would be a prophylactic rule making the Miranda “right [to] counsel nonwaiv-
able if confession bargaining is carried out.”  Dix, supra note 7, at 354 (emphasis omitted).
But, for the reasons stated in the text, such a “prophylaxis built upon prophylaxis,” Min-
nick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 166 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting), is probably
unwarranted.
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quoted from Bordenkircher v. Hayes, where the court wrote that “[d]efendants
advised by competent counsel and protected by other procedural safeguards are
presumptively capable of intelligent choice in response to prosecutorial per-
suasion, and unlikely to be driven to false self-condemnation.”224  But the
Court there was stating only a sufficient condition, not a necessary one, for
the legality of a plea bargain.  Professor Slobogin’s broader reading of this
language is unjustified for at least two reasons.  First, the constitutional right
to counsel does not apply to minor offenses; it would be surprising to learn
that pleas of guilty to such offenses by uncounseled defendants violate the
Constitution.225  Second, even where there is a right to counsel, a defendant
need not avail himself of that right, for he also has a constitutional right to go
it alone.226  Though the matter is not beyond dispute,227 it would also be
surprising to learn that a defendant has a constitutional right to make his way
alone through the labyrinthine process of trial—for which he must know the
rules of evidence, be reasonably adept at examining witnesses, make compre-
hensible arguments before the jury, and have a minimal understanding of
complex jury instructions—but, no matter how good a negotiator he fancies
himself, for that he must have counsel.228
224 Slobogin, supra note 6, at 1171 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978)).
225 True, innocent defendants often plead guilty to minor offenses.  Josh Bowers, Pun-
ishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1122 (2008).  But this does not contradict the
assertion that pleas to minor offenses when uncounseled are not necessarily coercive.
There does not appear to be any evidence that uncounseled innocent defendants are more
likely to plead guilty than counseled innocent defendants to minor offenses.  Indeed, given
the pressures that defense counsel often exert on their clients to plead guilty, see F. Andrew
Hessick III & Reshma M. Saujani, Plea Bargaining and Convicting the Innocent: the Role of the
Prosecutor, the Defense Counsel, and the Judge, 16 BYU J. PUB. L. 189, 207–15 (2002), one might
suspect that the reverse is true.
226 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 812 (1975).
227 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING & ORIN S. KERR, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 21.3(a), at 1030 (5th ed. 2009) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s recognition in
Faretta v. California of a constitutional right to proceed pro se . . . presumably is applicable
in the guilty plea context as well . . . .”); Stuntz, supra note 6, at 826–27 (assuming that
Faretta applies in the guilty plea context (footnote omitted)); see also Erica J. Hashimoto,
Defending the Right of Self-Representation: An Empirical Look at the Pro Se Felony Defendant, 85
N.C. L. REV. 423, 448–49 (2007) (documenting instances of pro se felony defendants who
pled guilty).
228 Professor White similarly argued that even kept “[p]romises made in the context of
custodial interrogation are likely to prove illusory because an unaided suspect lacks the
capacity to evaluate the actual value of any express or implied commitment made by the
police.”  White, Police Trickery, supra note 6, at 621 n.210.  But the suspect has the right to
demand legal counsel to advise her about the price she should ask for her information,
and she has been explicitly informed about that right.  Her decision to forge ahead
unaided is probably a foolish one but it is hers to make. Cf. George E. Dix, Promises, Confes-
sions, and Wayne LaFave’s Bright Line Rule Analysis, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 207, 253, 259 (sug-
gesting, but ultimately rejecting, the idea that “a general prophylactic prohibition against
promises during station house bargaining is inappropriate if the suspect is either repre-
sented or has been fairly offered representation and has refused it”).
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Moreover, Professor Erica Hashimoto’s empirical work suggests that pro
se defendants, at least those charged with misdemeanors, are at least as effec-
tive, perhaps even more so, at extracting favorable plea deals as attorneys
are.229  Of course, it is unfair to equate a negotiation that takes place in the
relatively hurried and harried atmosphere of the interrogation room to one
that takes place over the course of the weeks and months leading up to a trial
date.  Moreover, Professor Hashimoto’s conclusions on the relative efficacy
of uncounseled defendants vis-à-vis lawyers might not hold up when it comes
to the more serious crimes that, our common sense tells us, would more
likely precipitate a deceptive police interrogation.  But the claim here is a
much more modest one: the absence or presence of an attorney in plea
negotiations, by itself, does not mark the boundary between coercion and
noncoercion.  Uncounseled interrogation-room bargains are not per se
coercive.230
The second way in which Professor Slobogin distinguished interroga-
tion-room negotiation from plea bargaining was to assert that, with respect to
the former, “the implicit or explicit message [is] that if counsel is consulted,
the deal is off the table,” and that “that message directly undercuts both the
right to silence and the right to counsel.”231  If all interrogation-room negoti-
ation implicated a “no lawyers allowed” rule, then this would be true.  It
remains to be seen that this is so, however, and Professor Slobogin offers no
evidence that it is.  Granted that this might often, or even usually, be the
case.232  However, if bona fide interrogation-room negotiations could con-
ceivably occur without the implied threat that consultation with an attorney is
a nonstarter, and of course it could, then such negotiations are not coercive
per se but must be examined on a case-by-case basis.233  Courts have thus
229 Erica J. Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV.
461, 489–96 (2007).
230 Accord Rosenthal, supra note 4, at 937–38.
231 Slobogin, supra note 6, at 1171; accord Dix, supra note 228, at 247 (“[O]fficers may
be willing to ‘deal’ with a suspect only if the suspect is willing to deal immediately . . .
without consulting counsel . . . .”); Johnson, supra note 6, at 310 (“Promises of leniency
from the police during interrogation are . . . too likely to give [the] suspect the impression
that confession is the only way to escape conviction or mitigate the punishment.”); see also
Slobogin, supra note 207, at 1289 (asserting that a promise of leniency in the interrogation
room implies “that calling in an attorney to help with the decision will shut the door on
any possibility of a deal”).
232 Cf. United States v. Guarno, 819 F.2d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding confession
induced by cooperation agreement between government and uncounseled suspect not
coerced, even though government threatened to withdraw offer if suspect consulted with
counsel, reasoning that “law enforcement officials have legitimate reasons for protecting
the secrecy of ongoing investigations”).
233 See Pontow v. State, 205 N.W.2d 775, 778–79 (Wis. 1973) (“[W]e think it inappropri-
ate to lay down a rule that forbids the prosecutor from discussing the disposition of
charges with a defendant who manifestly prefers to negotiate on his own behalf.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-2\NDL207.txt unknown Seq: 39 10-DEC-20 10:28
2020] fraudulently  induced  confessions 837
distinguished between impermissible false promises of leniency and permissi-
ble inducement to confess by a promise of leniency that is later kept.234
Professor Stuntz also defended the status quo but on different grounds.
He reasoned that police interrogation raised two main concerns.  One was
that it “risk[s] confronting suspects with the dilemma of confession or per-
jury,”235 and that avoiding this dilemma is the Self-Incrimination Clause’s
primary concern.236  Second, “forcible [interrogation] tactics may result in
physical or emotional abuse that is either (1) inherently cruel or (2) the
functional equivalent of [extrajudicial] punishment.”237  Deception does not
raise these concerns.  “It avoids the confession-or-perjury dilemma either by
convincing the suspect that truthful statements will not have incriminating
consequences, or by making him forget temporarily that they will.”238  And it
is difficult to characterize deception that convinces suspects that their words
will not come back to haunt them as “unacceptably cruel” or as
“punishment.”239
Professor Stuntz is correct on the second point: it is difficult to conceive
of deception as abusive except where the statements of police would amount
to “abuse” even if the statements were true.  This approximates Professor
Slobogin’s equivalency rule.  But Professor Stuntz’s first point is underprotec-
tive vis-à-vis current doctrine.  Suppose, for example, police deceive a suspect
in a way that directly contradicts the Miranda warnings, as by telling her that,
despite what she has just been told, her statements are inadmissible in court
unless the police record them.  Such a suspect would feel no pressure from
the confession-or-perjury dilemma, just as if the police officer were masquer-
ading as a jailhouse confidante.  But only the latter is acceptable; the former
is not.
Professor Stuntz would likely say that there is an implicit exception for
deception that directly contradicts the Miranda warnings.  After all, he relies
upon the warnings to “take care of the central fifth amendment problem,”
allowing the police to engage in deception.240  It would be anomalous if per-
missible deception included tricking the suspects in a way that is inconsistent
with the warnings themselves.
But his view is also inconsistent with current law in a way that cannot be
so easily explained.  Where police falsely offer a suspect leniency in exchange
for a confession, the suspect is no longer exposed to the confession-or-per-
jury dilemma.  In the most drastic case, where the police falsely promise the
suspect full immunity, that is no different from the example in the preceding
234 See, e.g., Conner v. State, 982 S.W.2d 655, 661–62 (Ark. 1998). But see People v.
Vasila, 38 Cal. App. 4th 865, 874–76 (1995) (rejecting this distinction); cf. State v. Marini,
638 A.2d 507, 512–13 (R.I. 1994) (failing to recognize this distinction).
235 Stuntz, supra note 6, at 823.
236 Id. at 803.
237 Id. at 823.
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 Id. at 818.
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paragraph: assuring that the suspect’s words will never be used against her,
directly contradicting the Miranda warnings themselves.  But even where
police falsely offer, say, a lighter sentence than might otherwise be war-
ranted, the suspect still will not feel the pressure to either confess or commit
perjury.  The properly warned suspect will instead feel that she has been con-
fronted with a fair choice: confess and receive a lighter sentence, continue
negotiating (or, better yet, consult with counsel) to try to get a better deal, or
roll the dice at trial.  A perjurious claim of innocence is not a danger here.241
Yet courts agree that an outright false promise of leniency is an impermissi-
ble way of inducing a confession.
An approach that tries to explain current doctrine should attempt to
avoid all of these flaws.  It should accept the Supreme Court’s stated ratio-
nales for the constraints on interrogation practices.  It should try to capture
as much of existing doctrine as possible within its formulation.  And it should
be articulated with sufficient clarity so as to be administrable and capable of
predicting the outcomes of cases, thereby giving much needed guidance to
police, lawyers, and judges.  The first step is to recognize that even the most
egregiously deceptive practices used by police are not coercive at all in the
true sense of the word.  They are, instead, fraudulent.
III. DECEPTIVE INTERROGATION PRACTICES AS FRAUD, NOT COERCION
Deceptive interrogation practices are generally noncoercive, but they are
potentially fraudulent.  Once one accepts this recharacterization, one can
examine the law of fraud, and home in on its requirement of materiality in
order to both explain and justify current law.  Police deception during inter-
rogation is impermissible only when the deception relates to a material fact:
one that causes the suspect to forgo the right to remain silent and that would
cause a reasonable person in the suspect’s position to do the same.
A. Changing the Vocabulary of Deceptive Interrogation Practices
The first step in explaining and defending current law is to recognize
that deception is very different from coercion, and so courts should not con-
tinue to examine police deception within the framework of coercion.  What
police do when they deceive a suspect into speaking is not to coercively limit
the suspect’s choices to some uncertain normatively unacceptable level.
Police deception instead skews the suspect’s perception of the relative costs
and benefits of exercising, forgoing, and invoking the right to remain silent.
241 A perjurious confession (i.e., a false confession by an innocent suspect) is, of course,
a danger.  But, again, the danger of false confessions is not what drives the doctrine, see
supra text accompanying notes 166–78, as Professor Stuntz recognizes. See Stuntz, supra
note 6, at 802 (“The privilege against self-incrimination . . . by definition applies chiefly to
the factually guilty.”).
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1. Coercion vs. Fraud
The Supreme Court’s voluntariness cases mainly address instances of
putative coercion.  The use of the “overborne will” standard tells us that the
touchstone is whether the suspect has been subjected to external pressures,
overt or subtle, that wear down his will to resist self-incrimination to the point
where he has been deprived “of his free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse
to answer.”242  Early on, the cases dealt with either actual243 or threatened244
physical violence, or psychological pressures created by incessant, incommu-
nicado, round-the-clock questioning, often involving sleep deprivation, in
which the suspect had no ability to end the interrogation or even to predict
how much longer it would last.245  It makes some sense to conclude that a
suspect being whipped with a belt or who has not slept in over thirty-six hours
has been deprived of any meaningful choice not to speak.246  And although
the concept of coercion or duress is defined in slightly different ways in dif-
ferent areas of the law,247 the touchstone is always the loss of free will to
choose an alternative course of action.248
242 Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 241 (1941).
243 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 281–82 (1936).
244 Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35, 36 (1967) (per curiam) (police threatened to kill
suspect, then fired rifle next to suspect’s ear); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 564–65
(1958) (police threatened to turn suspect over to angry mob).
245 See, e.g., Darwin v. Connecticut, 391 U.S. 346, 349 (1968) (per curiam); Greenwald
v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1968) (per curiam); Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 709,
711–12 (1967); Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 739, 746–47, 752 (1966); Haynes v.
Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 504 (1963); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 52, 55 (1962);
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 622 (1961) (plurality); Stein v. New York, 346 U.S.
156, 185 (1953); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 53 (1949) (plurality); Ashcraft v. Tennessee,
322 U.S. 143, 153 (1944); see Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Coerced Confessions and the
Fourth Amendment, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 57, 66 (2002).
246 See Slobogin, supra note 6, at 1165 (“The physical abuse or prolonged (multi-day)
detention of suspects associated with first-generation practices is clearly coercive under the
Constitution.”).
247 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(1) (AM. L. INST. 1981) (duress
occurs when “manifestation of assent is induced by an improper threat . . . that leaves the
victim no reasonable alternative”); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) (AM. L. INST. 1985) (“It is
an affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the conduct charged to constitute an
offense because he was coerced to do so by the use of, or a threat to use, unlawful force
against his person or the person of another, that a person of reasonable firmness in his
situation would have been unable to resist.”).
248 Hinging the constitutionality of police conduct on a concept as slippery as “free
will,” which has eluded mankind for several thousand years, is obviously problematic. See
Slobogin, supra note 6, at 1165 (“The Court’s interrogation caselaw has always been vague
about the precise meaning of coercion, understandably so given how that concept has
perplexed moral philosophers.”).  But this Article takes the caselaw on coerced confessions
as it finds it.  Whatever “free will” means, it would be difficult to argue that someone who
makes a seemingly rational decision to act to her detriment on the basis of misrepresenta-
tion has been deprived of free will.
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But “deception is not coercion.”249  While both deception and coercion
are antithetical to autonomy, they operate in different ways.  There is both a
noncoercive and an informational dimension to autonomy.250  When police
misrepresent or omit a fact during interrogation, they are potentially engag-
ing in an infringement of a suspect’s autonomy only in the informational
sense.  In the interrogation context, though the Supreme Court has some-
times conflated the two,251 it recognized a difference between coercion and
deception when it wrote in Illinois v. Perkins that “Miranda forbids coercion,
not mere strategic deception.”252  As one commentator elaborated: “Per-
kins’s will was not impaired.  Perkins talked because he was fooled . . . and
not because he somehow could no longer resist the pressure or promises of a
relentless police officer.”253  The law generally disfavors both coercion and
deception, but it does so in different ways and for different reasons.
Generally, legally cognizable deception—fraud—has occurred when a
person is tricked into taking some action based on a misrepresentation or
omission of fact by another person.254  Free will has not been lost.  To the
contrary, the person deceived exercises free will to make a decision based on
inaccurate information intentionally supplied by another.  If I wire a sup-
posed Nigerian prince $10,000 because he has promised me a payout of $2
million, I have made a seemingly rational decision of my own free will based
on the handsome return on investment promised.  When the payout is not
forthcoming, one would say I was deceived, tricked, duped.  No one conver-
sant in the English language would say I was coerced.
This better describes the confession induced by deceptive interrogation
tactics.255  The premise underlying Miranda, and the law governing interro-
gation more generally, is that “a suspect’s will about whether to confess is the
249 Jed Rubenfeld, The Riddle of Rape-by-Deception and the Myth of Sexual Autonomy, 122
YALE L.J. 1372, 1411 (2013); see JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH AND THE LAW 109
(1993) (noting that at least some “trickery does not seem to involve a question of coer-
cion”). But see Alschuler, supra note 6, at 968 (observing with approval that “traditional
law” on confessions “collapses . . . the distinction between duress and fraud”).
250 Luis E. Chiesa, Solving the Riddle of Rape-by-Deception, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 407,
422–23 (2017); cf. Hritz, supra note 6, at 498 (observing that lies “invade[ ] the targets’
autonomy”); Young, supra note 6, at 470 (observing that lies used to induce waiver or
consent “encroach on an individual’s autonomy”).
251 See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969) (examining deception about incrimi-
nating evidence as a claim of coercion).
252 496 U.S. 292, 297 (1990); see also Magid, supra note 6, at 1210 (“Deceptive but non-
threatening interrogation will generally be no more unpleasant than the other intrusions
deemed reasonable after a showing of probable cause . . . .”).
253 Fred Cohen, Miranda and Police Deception in Interrogation: A Comment on Illinois v.
Perkins, 26 CRIM. L. BULL. 534, 540 (1990).
254 Hritz, supra note 6, at 498 (“[L]ies can vary targets’ estimates of the costs and bene-
fits of a course of action.”); Kitai-Sangero, supra note 6, at 644 (“Lies in general might hurt
a person’s ability to choose and make decisions based on relevant information.”).
255 Sasaki, supra note 6, at 1595 (“Police trickery should be viewed as a type of
fraud . . . .”); White, supra note 223, at 950 (observing that it “seem[s] counterintuitive” to
conclude that a suspect’s “will was overborne” when his confession was induced by a false
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product of a rational balancing of benefit versus potential harm.”256  Decep-
tive practices potentially skew the suspect’s decision whether to confess by
artificially altering her perception of the relative benefits of speaking and of
remaining silent.257
One element generally required to make out a case of fraud is material-
ity.  As the Supreme Court has written: “The well-settled meaning of ‘fraud’
required a misrepresentation or concealment of material fact.  Indeed . . .
the common law could not have conceived of ‘fraud’ without proof of materi-
ality.”258  For example, the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that the mis-
represented or omitted information must be material for even an intentional
misrepresentation or omission to constitute fraud.259  State and federal stat-
utes criminalizing or providing a civil action for fraud generally require that
materiality be proven.260
In the context of police deception during interrogations, the Supreme
Court has, in essence though not in words, adopted a materiality require-
ment.  Recall Moran v. Burbine, in which the Court held that failure to inform
promise of leniency, given that he was not “unable to make a rational choice” but rather
“chose to confess in order to receive the benefits . . . promised”).
256 George C. Thomas III, Miranda’s Illusion: Telling Stories in the Police Interrogation
Room, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1091, 1103 (2003) (reviewing WELSH S. WHITE, MIRANDA’S WARNING
PROTECTIONS: POLICE INTERROGATION PRACTICES AFTER DICKERSON (2001)).  For a more
elaborate enumeration of the various costs and benefits of speaking, see Janda, supra note
6, at 85–86.
257 Hritz, supra note 6, at 502 (“[L]ies distort the suspect’s estimates of the costs and
benefits of confessing.”); Kitai-Sangero, supra note 6, at 644 (“[L]ies during interrogation
harm a suspect’s ability to make decisions by distorting the information at their disposal
and changing their cost-benefit evaluation of confessing.”).
258 Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 22 (1999) (emphasis omitted).
259 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538(1) (AM. L. INST. 1977) (“Reliance upon a
fraudulent misrepresentation is not justifiable unless the matter misrepresented is
material.”).
260 See, e.g., Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 1996 (2016)
(“A misrepresentation about compliance with a statutory, regulatory, or contractual
requirement must be material to the Government’s payment decision in order to be
actionable under the False Claims Act.”); Neder, 527 U.S. at 25 (holding that “materiality of
falsehood is an element of the federal mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud statutes”); cf.
Alschuler, supra note 6, at 975 (“Material fraud vitiates most of life’s choices . . . .”); Paris,
supra note 6, at 64 (suggesting that policymakers limit police deception by using “the mate-
riality standard found in federal securities regulations”).
This is not to say that the law of fraud can be applied in the interrogation context
lock, stock, and barrel.  While deception occurs only sometimes, one hopes rarely, in ordi-
nary human interactions, deception is inherent in interrogation itself. See supra text
accompanying notes 180 to 192.  It is only to say that deceptive interrogation tactics are
better characterized as (potentially) a form of fraud than as a form of coercion.  After all,
the law guards against coercion in many different contexts and, one again hopes, it occurs
rarely, but coercion, like deception, is also inherent in interrogations. See Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 384 U.S. 436, 458 (1966).  Coercion and fraud are simply broad characterizations of
two very different sorts of incursions on autonomy; how they are defined in particular
contexts will necessarily vary.
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the suspect that a lawyer had been retained on his behalf and sought to
represent him during the interrogation did not vitiate the suspect’s waiver of
his Miranda rights.261  The Court rejected the notion from contract law that
intentionality of the omission, by itself, could render it fraudulent,262 stating
that it did not “believe that the level of the police’s culpability in failing to
inform” the suspect about the attorney “has any bearing on the validity of the
waivers.”263  Instead, the Court seemed to adopt the materiality requirement
from tort law when it conceded that “the additional information would have
been useful to [the suspect and] perhaps even it might have affected his
decision to confess,”264 but the omission nevertheless did not vitiate
Burbine’s waiver.
In Colorado v. Spring,265 the Court confirmed this understanding.  There,
recall, in reading the suspect his Miranda rights, the police failed to inform
him that they would be questioning him on a more serious crime, murder,
than the gun charge for which he was ostensibly arrested.266  Relying on
Burbine, the Court concluded that the omission did not invalidate the
waiver.267  Again, the Court conceded that the omitted information might
have had an effect on Spring’s decision to waive, observing that “any number
of factors could affect a suspect’s decision to waive his Miranda rights.”268
But the Court held as a matter of law that the omission here did not affect
Spring’s decision “in a constitutionally significant manner.”269
But if the Court admitted in both cases that provision of the omitted
information might have prevented Burbine and Spring from waiving their
rights, why does that not affect the validity of the waivers?  What makes infor-
mation “constitutionally significant” to the decision to waive?
The answer is materiality.  To say that the omitted information, had it
been provided, might have caused Burbine or Spring not to waive is to say
only that it might have mattered to them.  But that is different from saying
that the information was material, which is to say that it would have mattered
to a reasonable person in making the decision whether to waive.270  Burbine,
261 475 U.S. 412, 416–18, 421–24 (1986); see supra text accompanying notes 54–57.
262 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 162(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“A misrepre-
sentation is fraudulent if the maker intends his assertion to induce a party to manifest his
assent and the maker (a) knows or believes that the assertion is not in accord with the facts,
or (b) does not have the confidence that he states or implies in the truth of the assertion,
or (c) knows that he does not have the basis that he states or implies for the assertion.”).
263 Burbine, 475 U.S. at 423.
264 Id. at 422.
265 479 U.S. 564 (1987); see supra text accompanying notes 54 & 56.
266 Spring, 479 U.S. at 575 n.7.
267 Id. at 576–77.
268 See id. at 577 & n.9.
269 Id. at 577.
270 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 162(2) (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“A misrepre-
sentation is material if it would be likely to induce a reasonable person to manifest his
assent . . . .”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538(2)(a) (AM. L. INST. 1977) (“The
matter is material if . . . a reasonable man would attach importance to its existence or
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for example, had to decide whether he needed a lawyer to help him undergo
police interrogation.  Having been told of his right to counsel, he either
needed a lawyer or he didn’t.271  The fact that his family had retained a law-
yer for him was irrelevant to that determination.  So while that fact, if made
known to him, might have made him change his mind, that line of reasoning
on his part would be unreasonable.  As Professor Stuntz put it: “[I]rrational
waivers . . . do not implicate the concerns of the privilege against self-
incrimination.”272
Take an example from the law of securities fraud.  If my broker per-
suades me to buy a certain stock by misrepresenting her own education,
experience, and expertise in the stock market, that would be considered
fraud.  Because I am led to believe that my broker has a particular level of
expertise in deciding what stocks to buy, the misrepresentation induced me
to buy the stock and it would have had the same effect on the reasonable
person.  Her education, experience, and expertise are material facts.273  But
now imagine that I am a huge fan of Lady Gaga,274 and my broker persuades
me to buy the stock by falsely telling me that Lady Gaga owns a thousand
shares.  Again, I have been induced to act by the misrepresentation.  But
nonexistence in determining his choice of action in the transaction in question . . . .”); see
Sasaki, supra note 6, at 1600 (advocating “a materiality-based definition for police
trickery”).
Both the contract and the tort versions of materiality also would classify as material
those facts that might not be important to a reasonable person in making a decision but
that the maker knows to be important to the particular victim of the misrepresentation.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 162(2) (AM. L. INST. 1981); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 538(2)(b) (AM. L. INST. 1977).  This important caveat is consistent
with Supreme Court caselaw in the interrogation context that, while establishing otherwise
objective standards, also looks to whether the police intentionally exploited idiosyncrasies
of the particular suspect.  Thus, in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 302 (1980), the
Court held that interrogation includes “words or actions on the part of [the police] that
they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response [from the
suspect],” a seemingly objective standard.  However, the Court also noted that courts
should also take into account any police “knowledge . . . concerning the unusual suscepti-
bility of a defendant to a particular form of persuasion.” Id. at 302 n.8.
271 Stuntz, supra note 6, at 817–18 (asserting that Burbine’s knowledge of his right to
end questioning by requesting a lawyer was all he needed to make a valid decision).
272 Id. at 816.  One student commentator correctly articulated a standard for identify-
ing a material police misrepresentation during interrogation: “A material fact is one that a
reasonable suspect would attach importance to in determining whether or not to confess.
An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable suspect
would consider it important in deciding whether or not to confess.”  Sasaki, supra note 6, at
1601 (citation omitted).  However, he did not go on to examine with particularity how this
standard would apply to the vast array of deceptive interrogation tactics, advocating only
that all “police trickery”—a term that presumably incorporates the materiality standard—
be barred. Id. at 1612–14.  Moreover, he also advocated barring any “technique that takes
unfair advantage of the defendant’s emotions or scruples” without attempting to define
“unfair” or to explain how this is consistent with a materiality standard. Id. at 1614.
273 See SEC v. Constantin, 939 F. Supp. 2d 288, 306–08 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (mem.).
274 I am not.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-2\NDL207.txt unknown Seq: 46 10-DEC-20 10:28
844 notre dame law review [vol. 96:2
here, there was no misrepresentation of a material fact.  Lady Gaga (so far as
I know) is not an expert on the stock market, so whether she owns a particu-
lar stock should be irrelevant, and would be irrelevant to a reasonable per-
son.  That I would have refrained from the transaction absent the
information is not enough to make the information material.
One might argue that positing Burbine’s decision as a binary one—
either he needed a lawyer or he did not—is a simplistic approach to human
decisionmaking.275  Not all decisions we make necessarily are of the either/
or variety.  “[M]ost preferences are not relatively fixed [and] are, instead,
radically contingent and shifting.”276  When a dinner party host asks me if I
would like some wine, I might answer that I will take a glass if a bottle is
already open, but not to bother otherwise.  In such a case, I would say that I
have decided that I would like some wine but this desire might be mitigated
by exogenous factors, so that I could also say that the desire is not so strong
as to overcome my hesitance to cause inconvenience to my host.  In this
sense, it is a false dichotomy to say that I either want wine or I do not.
But a police interrogation is not a dinner party, and a lawyer is not a
glass of wine.  The suspect in custody has just been informed that this is seri-
ous business: that if he chooses to speak, his words will be used to send him
to prison or the death chamber.  And he has been informed that, to better
help him make the decision whether to speak, he is entitled to have an attor-
ney present.  If the warnings have had their intended effect,277 we are enti-
tled to assume that exogenous considerations have fallen away, overwhelmed
by the suspect’s awareness of the gravity and solemnity of his plight.  Under
such circumstances, we are entitled to assume that the suspect means what he
says: that he does not need an attorney.
In both Burbine and Spring, of course, the claim was that deception
induced the Miranda waiver, not that deception induced the confession.
That is to say, both cases presented a Self-Incrimination Clause, not a due
process, issue.  Yet, because deception is not coercion, it makes more sense to
recast deception not as a due process issue but as a Self-Incrimination Clause
issue.  The due process voluntariness analysis was developed with true coer-
cion—physical and psychological torture—in mind.  Deception is better
thought of as implicating the Fifth Amendment and its associated Miranda
rights: At what point does deception vitiate a suspect’s otherwise free choice
to forgo those rights and speak against her own interests?278
275 See Thomas, supra note 6, at 1108 (arguing that viewing choice as “dichotomous”
“perhaps manifests a mistaken understanding of human action”).
276 Id. at 1095.
277 Whether they have or not is, of course, contestable, but that controversy is beyond
the scope of this Article, which assumes that Miranda warnings are sufficient to inform the
suspect of the gravity of his situation.
278 Cf. Slobogin, supra note 6, at 1179 (“[F]or all practical purposes, the protection
afforded by the Due Process Clause and the protection guaranteed by the Fifth Amend-
ment after the warnings are given and putatively understood are co-extensive.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-2\NDL207.txt unknown Seq: 47 10-DEC-20 10:28
2020] fraudulently  induced  confessions 845
Although the Fifth Amendment bars compulsion to speak, the Supreme
Court has recognized that a Fifth Amendment violation can occur even with-
out compulsion, as where the government manipulates one’s choice whether
to assert the privilege.  Thus, in Griffin v. California, the Court held that
prosecutorial comment on a defendant’s failure to testify violated the Fifth
Amendment not by literally compelling the defendant to testify—indeed,
Griffin applies only when the defendant has not testified—but by making the
assertion of the privilege too costly.279  If prosecutorial comment “cuts down
on the privilege by making its assertion costly,”280 then police deception can
cut down on the privilege by seeming to make its assertion worthless.
Thinking about police deception during interrogation as inducing
waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege is supported by recent develop-
ments in the law of Miranda waiver, which suggest that there really is no
difference between deception as vitiating a Miranda waiver and deception as
inducing a confession.281  Inducing a confession is, in effect, inducing a
waiver of the Fifth Amendment and its associated Miranda rights.
279 380 U.S. 609, 613–14 (1965). Griffin itself may have been wrongly decided. See
Salinas v. Texas, 570 U.S. 178, 192 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (argu-
ing that Griffin should be overruled because “[a] defendant is not ‘compelled . . . to be a
witness against himself’ simply because a jury has been told that it may draw an adverse
inference from his silence” (alteration in original)).  As discussed above, see supra text
accompanying notes 213–14, the Constitution generally does not forbid the State from
exacting a price for the exercise of a constitutional right, but merely forbids the State from
manipulating that choice by “creating those adverse consequences . . . in a way that specifi-
cally targets the exercise of a constitutional right.”  The outcome of Griffin is questionable
because prosecutorial comment on a defendant’s silence is consistent with the prerogative
of any litigant, civil or criminal, to point out to the jury the absence of relevant evidence.
By contrast, police deception is designed to result in forfeiture of the privilege by creating
the impression that its assertion has no value.
280 Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614.
281 Cf. Thomas, supra note 6, at 1185 (noting that after Miranda, “[i]t seemed quite
logical to conclude that since a trickery-induced waiver would be deemed involuntary, a
trickery-induced confession should be equally involuntary”).  Indeed, even the Court in
Colorado v. Spring no doubt inadvertently, elided the two when it wrote that the Court had
previously “found affirmative misrepresentations by the police sufficient to invalidate a sus-
pect’s waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege.”  479 U.S. 564, 576 n.8 (1987) (first citing
Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963); and then citing Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315
(1959)).  Of course, the Courts in Lynumn and Spano did no such thing, given that both
were decided before the Court held in Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S.
52, 79 (1964), that the Self-Incrimination Clause applied to the States. Lynumn and Spano
(arguably) found such misrepresentations sufficient to render a confession coerced in vio-
lation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  But, as this and the next sub-
section show, the Court in Spring accidentally got the right answer: police deception
during interrogation ought to be seen as affecting the validity of the suspect’s implicit
waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege, not the voluntariness of the confession.
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2. Police Deception During Interrogation as Fraudulent Inducement of a
Miranda Waiver
For many years after Miranda, it was generally assumed that the warn-
ings-and-waiver protocol contemplated discrete, sequential events: first warn-
ings, then waiver, then interrogation.  To put it another way, Miranda was
seen as creating a right to avoid interrogation altogether, and thus waiver
naturally had to precede interrogation, because interrogation without waiver
violated the right to avoid interrogation.  Indeed, the right to avoid interro-
gation is still a big part of Miranda jurisprudence,282 as it is the premise of
the invocation cases, which hold that a suspect has the right to end interroga-
tion by invoking the right to silence283 or the right to counsel.284
That view was shattered in Berghuis v. Thompkins,285 at least in the waiver
context.286  There, the Court held that waiver need not precede interroga-
tion in order for a resulting statement to be valid.  The police in that case
read Thompkins the Miranda warnings and then, without first obtaining a
waiver, interrogated Thompkins for some two hours and forty-five min-
utes.287  He initially provided short (presumably noninculpatory) verbal and
nonverbal responses to some questions by the detective, Helgert.288  Then, as
the Court related it: “Helgert asked Thompkins, ‘Do you believe in God?’
Thompkins . . . said ‘Yes.’ . . . .  Helgert asked, ‘Do you pray to God?’
Thompkins said ‘Yes.’  Helgert asked, ‘Do you pray to God to forgive you for
shooting that boy down?’  Thompkins answered ‘Yes . . . .’”289  The Court
held that Thompkins’s responses were admissible because the one-word state-
282 See Sacharoff, supra note 35, at 583–88.
283 Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104–05 (1975).
284 Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1981).  Invocation of the right to silence
ends interrogation only temporarily, as police may attempt to interrogate at a later time.
Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104–05.  Invocation of the right to counsel, by contrast, is more robust:
police may attempt to reinterrogate only if the suspect himself reinitiates a conversation
about the crime, see Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1044 (1983) (“[B]efore a suspect
in custody can be subjected to further interrogation after he requests an attorney there
must be a showing that the ‘suspect himself initiates dialogue with the authorities.’” (quot-
ing Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42, 46 (1982))), or the suspect has been out of custody for at
least fourteen days, see Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 117 (2010), or counsel is actually
present for the interrogation, see Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153 (1990).
285 560 U.S. 370, 387–88 (2010); see Meghan Morris, The Decision Zone: The New Stage of
Interrogation Created by Berghuis v. Thompkins, 39 AM. J. CRIM. L. 271, 273 (2012)
(“Thompkins is the first decision to explicitly allow police to interrogate a suspect before
obtaining any waiver, whether implied or explicit, of a suspect’s constitutional rights.”
(emphasis omitted)).
286 “[T]here is considerable tension between how the Court has addressed invocation
and how it addressed waiver in Thompkins.”  Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, The Two
Mirandas, 43 N. KY. L. REV. 317, 356 (2016).
287 Thompkins, 560 U.S. at 374–76.
288 Id. at 375–76.
289 Id. at 376 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
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ments themselves constituted waiver of the Miranda rights.290  That is, the
waiver of the right not to speak and testimonial evidence resulting from that
waiver were one and the same: the word “yes.”
After Thompkins, the warnings-waiver-interrogation process must be
viewed as holistic rather than purely sequential.  Though warnings must still
come first, the waiver/interrogation dynamic is organic rather than rigidly
formal.  If waiver can come about in the form of a response to a question,
then, in effect, every response to interrogation is an instance of waiver.  That
is to say, every question provides the suspect the opportunity to either invoke
his rights, thereby ending the interrogation, to waive them by speaking, or to
exercise his rights by remaining silent, as Thompkins did for over two hours.
To invoke, he must do so expressly and unambiguously.291  To waive, he
need only answer.  The suspect has this decision to make on a question-by-
question basis.
Language from Thompkins confirms this organic understanding of the
interrogation process, contemplating a rational actor calibrating his self-
interest to the progress of the interrogation, and continually evaluating and
reevaluating whether to waive, invoke, or do nothing:
Interrogation provides the suspect with additional information that can put
his or her decision to waive, or not to invoke, into perspective.  As question-
ing commences and then continues, the suspect has the opportunity to con-
sider the choices he or she faces and to make a more informed decision,
either to insist on silence or to cooperate.  When the suspect knows that
Miranda rights can be invoked at any time, he or she has the opportunity to
reassess his or her immediate and long-term interests.292
The Thompkins Court confirmed the understanding that waiver occurs on a
question-by-question basis when it wrote that the Miranda requirements are
satisfied “if a suspect receives adequate Miranda warnings, understands them,
and has an opportunity to invoke the rights before giving any answers or
admissions.”293  Thus, every question presents a new opportunity to waive or
invoke (or remain silent), and any answer can be viewed as a waiver.
This view of Miranda waiver accords with treatment of the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege in more formal settings.  The rights that Miranda provides the
suspect in custodial interrogation track the rights of, say, the grand jury wit-
ness but for three additional rights that Miranda provides: the right to be
advised of the rights, the right to the presence of counsel, and the right to
290 Id. at 388.  This result was prefigured in an early Third Circuit case, Collins v. Brierly,
492 F.2d 735, 739 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc).  The Collins court reasoned that, because the
suspect can cut off questioning at any time by invoking her rights, any pre-interrogation
“waiver” is revocable at will. See id.  Thus, “a ‘waiver’ in its usual sense does not occur until
a [suspect] actually answers a question.” Id.  It follows that, because the suspect continues
to enjoy the right to cut off questioning even after answering questions, every answer is a
separate waiver.
291 See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994).
292 Thompkins, 560 U.S. at 388.
293 Id. at 387 (emphasis added).
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cut off questioning.294  It is well settled that the grand jury witness must
invoke the privilege expressly on a question-by-question basis or it will be
deemed waived as to that question295 and to any other addressing the same
subject matter.296  Thus, the grand jury witness must assess her position vis-à-
vis potential self-incrimination on a question-by-question basis, and make a
decision to either forgo the privilege and speak or invoke the privilege and
remain silent.297 Thompkins simply recognizes that this same dynamic exists
in the interrogation room, without upsetting the interrogee’s most potent
weapon, not shared by the grand jury witness: the right to cut off
questioning.
This detour into the intricacies of Miranda waiver and the view of waiver
augured by Thompkins now lets us reevaluate the jurisprudence on deceptive
interrogation practices in light of Miranda’s caution that police may not
“threaten[ ], trick[ ], or cajole[ ]” the suspect into waiving her rights.298  If
suspects may not be “tricked” into waiving their Miranda rights, and if waiver
of Miranda rights is most accurately viewed as a continuing series of question-
by-question decisions to speak rather than exercise or invoke the privilege,
then deceptive interrogation practices are directly subject to Miranda’s pro-
scription against trickery, no matter when during the interrogation that
deception occurs.  That is, if each question during the interrogation presents
the suspect with a new opportunity to waive, exercise, or invoke, then a new
decision, a new assessment of the costs and benefits of speaking, must be
made each time.  Any deception during the interrogation is covered by the
“trickery” language of Miranda.299
But that is not to say that all such trickery is forbidden by Miranda.
Miranda forbids only police conduct that tricks the suspect “into a waiver,”
suggesting a causal nexus between the trickery and the waiver.300  To be
“tricked . . . into a waiver,” the deception must have both induced the waiver
and—this is critical—it must be such as would have the same effect on a
294 See United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 579–81 (1976) (plurality opinion)
(observing that there is no right to either warnings or counsel in the grand jury room, and
that “even when the grand jury witness asserts the privilege, questioning need not cease,
except as to the particular subject to which the privilege has been addressed.”).
295 United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, 148 (1931) (“The privilege of silence . . . is
deemed waived unless invoked.”).
296 Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 373 (1951) (“Disclosure of a fact waives the
privilege as to details.”).
297 The third option to the suspect in custody—exercise the right to remain silent with-
out invoking it—is not available to the grand jury witness.  If she neither waives the privi-
lege by speaking nor expressly invokes it, she is guilty of contempt.
298 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966).
299 Id. at 453–55.
300 Id. at 476.
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reasonable person.  This is the materiality requirement implicit in Burbine301
and Spring.302
According to these principles, one can finally articulate a useable stan-
dard for determining when deceptive interrogation tactics by the police go
too far.  Putting to one side Professor Slobogin’s “equivalency rule”—that
deception is coercive when the information would have resulted in coercion
even if true303—police deception during interrogation is intolerable if, but
only if (1) it causes the suspect to falsely believe that the benefits of speaking
outweigh the benefits of remaining silent, and (2) a reasonable person in the
suspect’s position would have the same belief.304  Not only does this standard
accord with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on Miranda waiver, it also
provides the best explanation for the jurisprudence on deceptive interroga-
tion practices as it has developed in the lower courts.
B. A Fresh Look at Fraudulently Induced Confessions
The jurisprudence on deceptive interrogation practices can be reexam-
ined under a new rubric.  Such practices are correctly characterized as poten-
tially fraudulent rather than coercive, with materiality as the key difference
between permissible and impermissible deception.  The question for all types
of deceptive interrogation is this: Would a reasonable person, aware of her
rights,305 be induced by the deception to believe falsely that the benefits of
speaking to the police outweigh the benefits of remaining silent?  If so, then
the particular tactic is constitutionally impermissible.  Using this standard,
the cases actually make a lot of sense.
301 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 422–23 (1986); see supra text accompanying notes
55–58.
302 Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 577 (1987); see supra text accompanying notes
265–69.
303 See supra text accompanying notes 210–13.
304 The phrase “in the subject’s position” is capacious enough here, as it is in other
areas of the law, to include some idiosyncratic characteristics of the actual suspect that bear
on her particular susceptibility to certain deceptive techniques.  In particular, there is wide
agreement that juveniles and those with intellectual disabilities, and perhaps others, are
more vulnerable to such practices. See Slobogin, supra note 207, at 1291.  This is likely
because they tend to defer more strongly to those in authority and therefore will tend to
over-value the benefits of speaking to the police.  The analysis that follows assumes a more
typical suspect, not a member of a vulnerable population. Cf. Ex parte Hill, 557 So.2d 838,
842 (Ala. 1989) (disapproving of false evidence ploy in light of suspect’s “borderline
mental retardation, his schizophrenic personality or schizoid personality disorder, the evi-
dence of possible brain damage, and [his] emotional state at the time of the interroga-
tion”); Young, supra note 6, at 453 (observing that courts have approved of deceit of
suspects “as young as sixteen” and those “with below-average intelligence”).
305 Although some interrogation takes place in a noncustodial setting, and therefore is
not necessarily preceded by Miranda warnings, the law presumes that suspects in such set-
tings are aware of their rights. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 498–99.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-2\NDL207.txt unknown Seq: 52 10-DEC-20 10:28
850 notre dame law review [vol. 96:2
1. Impermissible Deception
The most obvious category of impermissible deception under this stan-
dard is deception that contradicts or distorts the meaning of the Miranda
warnings.  The suspect’s primary weapons against manipulative police tactics
are the Miranda warnings themselves.  Rather than ban these tactics outright,
the Miranda Court’s central aim was to arm the suspect with the knowledge
that he need not speak to the police, that his words can be used against him
in a later criminal case, and that he can consult with legal counsel about his
predicament.306  The doctrine assumes that the suspect will have the where-
withal to employ this knowledge of his rights to his benefit.  But this assump-
tion is shattered if the police say or do something that contradicts or distorts
the meaning of the warnings.307
Thus, for example, police assurance that their conversation is “off the
record” or confidential directly contradicts the warning that the suspect’s
inculpatory words will invariably come back to haunt him at trial.  So, too,
falsely conveying the impression that exercising the right to counsel will
harm him distorts the meaning of the Miranda right to counsel by making it
appear to the suspect that he has that right only as a formal or technical
matter and that any attempt to actually exercise it will occasion adverse con-
sequences.  Furthermore, any deceit that conveys the message that his silence
can be used against him by the jury again contradicts Miranda by falsely por-
traying that right as having far less value to the suspect than it actually has.
This constraint also explains Missouri v. Seibert,308 where police intentionally
306 Magid, supra note 6, at 1175 (“Instead of forbidding [deceptive] techniques . . . the
Court protected suspects by requiring that police inform suspects of their rights to remain
silent and to be provided with an attorney . . . .”).
307 GRANO, supra note 249, at 114 (“Police may not deceive defendants about the
nature or scope of their legal rights.”); LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 227, § 6.9(c), at 396
(“[T]here is an absolute prohibition upon any trickery which misleads the suspect as to the
existence or dimensions of any of the applicable rights . . . .”); WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN,
supra note 55, at 404 (“[I]t may be useful to make a distinction between trickery as to the
contents of the warnings and trickery as to other aspects of the case.”); Alschuler, supra
note 6, at 976 n.91 (“Misrepresenting a suspect’s legal rights . . . merits unqualified con-
demnation.  If legal rights are to be meaningful, they must be known and understood.  Law
enforcement officers should not be able effectively to repeal these rights at random by
persuading people that they do not exist.”); Mosteller, supra note 6, at 1265 (“[L]ies that
directly undercut the statements in the Miranda warnings will render the warnings and
waiver ineffective.”); Roppé, supra note 6, at 767 (“When an interrogator misrepresents the
significance of the Miranda warning, the protective purpose of the warning is not achieved;
it is as if the suspect were not warned at all.”); Slobogin, supra note 6, at 1168 (calling
deceptive techniques that contradict the Miranda warnings “[t]he most obviously coercive
deceptive practices”); White, Police Trickery, supra note 6, at 590 (“If the Miranda warnings
are to serve th[eir] necessary prophylactic function effectively, police trickery that distorts
their meaning or vitiates their effect should render a resulting confession inadmissible.”);
Young, supra note 6, at 428 n.14 (“Because Miranda affirmatively requires police to tell
suspects their rights in interrogation, the natural counterpart is that police may not lie
about a suspect’s right to counsel or right to refuse to respond to questions.”).
308 542 U.S. 600 (2004); see supra text accompanying notes 58–65.
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failed to give warnings before eliciting initial, inadmissible statements, and
then went on to elicit virtually identical statements after having given the
warnings.309  Without expressly dispelling a suspect’s reasonable inference
that her initial statements could be used against her, police in effect falsely
conveyed the notion that remaining silent at that point had zero value.  This
kind of deception operates on the “benefits of remaining silent” side of the
equation.  It gives the suspect the false impression that the benefits of assert-
ing his rights are far less than they really are, or even that there is no such
benefit at all.  Thus, any perceived benefit of speaking to the police, even
some minimal psychic benefit of coming clean, will likely win out.
False promises of leniency, also impermissible, operate on the other side
of the equation.  They deceive the suspect into forgoing the benefits of
remaining silent because the benefits of speaking are so great.  Where the
suspect is offered leniency in exchange for information, she is, in essence,
engaging in plea negotiations.  And plea negotiations are so ubiquitous
because they actually do offer great benefits to defendants that, in the minds
of the overwhelming majority of them, outweigh the benefits of asserting
their constitutional rights.  Thus, it is easy to see why false promises of leni-
ency constitute impermissible deception.  Most defendants would gladly sac-
rifice their privilege against self-incrimination in exchange for the benefit of
less prison time.  They do so all the time and are entirely rational in doing so.
When the promise of leniency is illusory, the suspect has been duped into
making a tradeoff that would be entirely reasonable if the bargain were a real
one.310
The difficulty is in determining when a mere suggestion of leniency
becomes, in effect, a promise.  It may be that most suspects do not “distin-
guish clearly between explicit . . . promises and more ambiguous lan-
guage.”311  Thus, it may be that courts have been too stingy in some cases in
interpreting references to possible leniency as nothing but abstract sugges-
tions.  Again, a reasonableness standard should be used: How would a reason-
able suspect under the circumstances have interpreted the police officer’s
309 See Morris, supra note 285, at 281–82 (explaining Seibert as a case in which the
“police . . . purposefully undermine[d] the effectiveness of Miranda warnings”).
310 Professor White suggested quite sensibly that broken government promises of leni-
ency to induce a confession would also violate due process under Santobello v. New York, 404
U.S. 257 (1971).  White, Police Trickery, supra note 6, at 956, 974 n.160; see also Rosenthal,
supra note 4, at 955 n.341.
311 Gohara, supra note 6, at 825; see also Johnson, supra note 6, at 310–11 (“[T]he differ-
ence between expressions of compassionate understanding on the one hand, and implied
promises of leniency on the other, is at the margin sometimes a matter of emphasis and
nuance.”); Slobogin, supra note 6, at 1168–69 (recognizing this difficulty); White, supra
note 223, at 955 (asserting that “[t]he more common police practice . . . is to suggest to the
suspect, without making an explicit commitment, that he will be rewarded for his
statement”).
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language?312  That is the standard we generally use in determining what par-
ticular language means during police-citizen encounters.313
Thus, juxtaposing the truthful statement that the suspect faced the
death penalty with a statement that “it would be better for him if he told the
truth” would likely cause a reasonable person to conclude that he is being
offered leniency in exchange for a statement.314  Likewise, telling a suspect
that “[h]ow much time” he serves “is up to [him]” sounds very like telling the
suspect that the length of his sentence will be calibrated to how much he tells
the police.315  And telling a suspect that that “things would ‘go better’ for
[him] if he cooperated,” sounds much more like a promise than “[a] ‘predic-
tion about future events.’”316  On the other hand, an interrogator’s promise
“that he would ‘help [the suspect] in every way in the world’” is vague
enough that a reasonable person would not infer that the officer was promis-
ing anything more than to put in a good word to the prosecutor.317  And
telling a suspect that the prosecutor will be informed about the suspect’s
cooperation properly conveys to the reasonable person that the decision
whether to extend leniency is in the hands of the prosecutor, not the
police.318
Finally, one can understand why some lies about matters extrinsic to the
interrogation room—even those falling outside the confines of the
equivalency rule319—are impermissible.  Take the Thomas case.  Thomas was
312 See White, supra note 223, at 976 (“[T]he determination whether a government
promise has been made and breached should be made on the basis of the suspect’s reason-
able expectations.”); White, Miranda’s Failure, supra note 6, at 1236–37 (“If the interroga-
tor should be aware that either the suspect or a reasonable person in the suspect’s position
would perceive that the interrogator’s statements indicate that the suspect would be likely
to receive significant leniency if he did confess . . . then the interrogator’s statements
should be viewed as improper.”).
313 See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 431 (1991) (observing that touchstone of
whether a Fourth Amendment seizure has occurred is whether “a reasonable person would
understand that he or she could refuse to cooperate”); Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251
(1991) (“The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the Fourth
Amendment is that of ‘objective’ reasonableness—what would the typical reasonable per-
son have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?”).
314 But see State v. Simmons, 944 S.W.2d 165, 175 (Mo. 1997) (en banc) (rejecting claim
of coercion).
315 But see State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 936 (Utah 1998) (alteration in original) (finding
no coercion).
316 Mason v. State, 116 S.W.3d 248, 260 (Tex. App. 2003) (quoting United States v.
Fraction, 795 F.2d 12, 15 (3d Cir. 1986)).
317 But see Pyles v. State, 947 S.W.2d 754, 755–56 (Ark. 1997) (finding coercion).
318 See State v. Sanford, 569 So.2d 147, 152 (La. Ct. App. 1990).
319 That is to say, some lies about matters extrinsic to the interrogation are impermissi-
ble only if the statement, if it were true, would be coercive.  Again, threats to have one’s
children taken away, as in Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 531–34 (1963), or to have a
family member arrested, as in Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 535 (1961), provide the
best examples. See supra text accompanying notes 22–24.  But such statements are coercive
or not irrespective of whether they are deceptive.  For a nuanced analysis of whether such
statements should be deemed coercive, see Godsey, supra note 169, at 530–32.
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presented with the choice between the benefits of the privilege against self-
incrimination, at the cost of his son’s life, and the benefit of saving his son’s
life at the cost of self-accusation and the resultant certain conviction at trial.
That Thomas was willing to sacrifice his Fifth Amendment privilege to save
his son should not be surprising: the deception made his “constitutionally
protected option to remain silent seem valueless” when placed on the other
side of the ledger from saving his son’s life.320  Though perhaps not every
father would do the same, it is safe to assume that the reasonable father in
Thomas’s shoes would have.
Once again, close cases will arise.  Imagine it was not Thomas’s son
whose life was supposedly on the line, but a friend, or a coworker, or a com-
plete stranger.  As we go further out in concentric circles around Thomas
himself, it becomes less and less likely that a reasonable person in his posi-
tion would have sacrificed his privilege.  But the pre-Miranda case of Spano v.
New York—involving deception about the specter of economic harm to
Spano’s childhood friend and his wife and young children321—still might
provide some guidance.322  As in all places in the law, the concept of reasona-
bleness must take on some normative component; courts must ask to what
extent we would hope and expect that people would sacrifice their Fifth
Amendment rights for the well-being of others.
2. Permissible Deception
Deception about the adversarial role of the police cuts against but does
not contradict or distort the meaning of the Miranda warnings.  Police empa-
thy or friendliness toward the subject might “mak[e] him forget temporarily
that” he is speaking to an adversary.323  But having been told at the outset
that he is, and that his words can and will come back to bite him, a reasona-
ble person should be expected not to be swayed by the seeming friendliness
of the police.  For this reason, mere expressions of sympathy or friendliness
on the part of the police do not “negate the effect of the second Miranda
warning,” contrary to Professor White’s claim.324  It is not too much to ask
that the suspect embrace both concepts in his head simultaneously: the
320 People v. Thomas, 8 N.E.3d 308, 315 (N.Y. 2014); see White, supra note 223, at 963
n.106 (“Government inducements relating to a third party who is very close to the suspect
are likely to exert great pressure on the suspect because the suspect, especially if he is
experiencing a sense of shame, may be inclined to place the welfare of the third party
above his own.”); White, Miranda’s Failure, supra note 6, at 1241 (“[A] suspect might easily
be led to feel that protecting his friend or loved one from imminent harm is more impor-
tant than the future consequences of confessing.”).
321 360 U.S. 315, 323 (1959); see supra text accompanying notes 9–14.
322 White, Miranda’s Failure, supra note 6, at 1241 (“Based on an appropriate reading of
Spano, interrogators should . . . be prohibited from informing a suspect that his failure to
confess will lead to serious adverse consequences for a friend or loved one.”).
323 Stuntz, supra note 6, at 823.
324 White, Police Trickery, supra note 6, at 617.
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police are acting nicely toward me now but they have just told me to watch
what I say.325
The same is true for police minimization of the crime, which is closely
related.  Suggestions that the crime was not as serious as it actually was are
also not inconsistent with the warning that the suspect’s self-incriminating
words are fair game at trial.  Unless the suspect is actually in the process of
negotiating a deal, the benefit of supplying the police with information
approaches zero.  Of course, the suspect might hope that by supplying infor-
mation, he will be treated to the quid pro quo of leniency; clearly, that
explains why so many suspects speak when they should not.  But that is akin
to a shopkeeper allowing patrons to walk out of the shop with goods in the
hopes that the customers will eventually pay for them.  Unless a quid pro quo
is in the offing, the suspect is simply giving away valuable information for
free.  That is not something a reasonable person would do.326
Perhaps the most controversial types of deception that police use during
interrogation, and the ones that have been the targets of much scholarly criti-
cism, are the false (and, more controversially, fabricated) evidence ploys.
But here, too, a reasonable person would not be swayed to forgo the privilege
simply because she has been presented with putative evidence of guilt.
Granted, where the police falsely present such evidence to the suspect, the
value of the privilege in her mind goes way down.  Since the police already
supposedly have rock solid evidence of guilt, a confession would simply be
the cherry atop the prosecutor’s case.  At the same time, the putative benefit
of speaking goes up, because the suspect will be hoping to cut her losses and
make a deal.327  This is true even (and most problematically, to be sure) of
an innocent suspect, who might either feel that further resistance is futile
because she is being framed or internalize the accusations and become con-
vinced of her own guilt.328
325 Again, this is true of noncustodial interrogation as well, except that there the sus-
pect is presumed to know to watch what she says, though she has not been so advised.
326 Stuntz, supra note 6, at 763 (“[A] rational, factually guilty defendant who under-
stands his rights and the consequences of relinquishing them would almost never waive
them except as part of a bargain . . . .”); see also Cohen, supra note 253, at 545 (“[A]n
accused either can donate the information needed to convict him, or he can exchange
information for the best deal he and counsel are able to negotiate.”); Mosteller, supra note
6, at 1248 (“Cooperation may be the appropriate outcome, but suspects should not make
incriminating statements for nothing . . . .”).
327 Gohara, supra note 6, at 818; Hamblet, supra note 6, at 130; Jacobi, supra note 6, at
68; Kitai-Sangero, supra note 6, at 633; Thomas, supra note 6, at 1192.
328 See Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice
and Irrational Action, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 979, 997–1000 (1997) (distinguishing between
compliant false confessions, which the innocent suspect gives knowing himself to be inno-
cent, and persuaded false confessions, which the innocent suspect gives having been per-
suaded that he is guilty); see also Jacobi, supra note 6, at 65; Khasin, supra note 6, at 1033;
Kitai-Sangero, supra note 6, at 630; Thomas, supra note 6, at 1118; Wynbrandt, supra note
6, at 552.
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But even here, a reasonable person in the situation would determine
that the benefits of holding onto the privilege outweigh the benefits of speak-
ing.  The value of the privilege has been reduced but it is still worth some-
thing.  There are few pieces of evidence as compelling as a defendant’s own
admission.  And more evidence is always more powerful than less; even if the
prosecutor has a solid case against the suspect, there is no need to add to it
with a confession.329  Meanwhile, the value of speaking is the same as it is
whenever there is no deal on the table: zero.  It simply is not true that there
are “relatively high benefits” of speaking under these circumstances just
because “the suspect may be spared a harsh penalty.”330  That the suspect has
valuable information to provide and seeks leniency in return should signal to
her that the time has come to consult with counsel—which the suspect in
custody has just been told she has a right to do—to get the best deal possible,
not give away the store in hopes of future payment.331  And what is true of
verbal misrepresentations of incriminating evidence is no less true of
fabricated evidence, notwithstanding the handful of courts that have held
that the latter crosses the line into a constitutional violation.
One type of deception that does not fit into the analysis in quite the
same way is deception about whether an official interrogation is even taking
place.  That is because, pursuant to Illinois v. Perkins,332 Miranda warnings are
unnecessary, and therefore will never be issued, when police question a sus-
pect without revealing their identity.  But the reason that the warnings are
not required in that context is that surreptitious police interrogation does
not create the compelling atmosphere that Miranda found inherent in most
other custodial interrogation.  Absent that compulsion, as with overt but non-
custodial interrogation, every person is presumed to know and be able to
assert their rights.  Thus, the calculation of whether the benefits of remain-
ing silent outweigh the benefits of speaking can and should still be made,
even if the incriminating statements would be made to, ostensibly, a nonstate
agent.  A reasonable person aware of her legal rights would know that any-
thing she says to (almost) anyone can later be repeated in a courtroom.  Of
course, the fact that the addressee is, unbeknownst to the speaker, a police
officer raises that probability considerably.  But a prudent speaker with self-
incriminating information should know that there is virtually no benefit in
gratuitously revealing that information to anyone.  Thus, she should still
329 See Thomas, supra note 184, at 1299 (“[W]hy make matters worse by offering a
confession?”).
330 Gohara, supra note 6, at 818 (emphasis added).
331 Stuntz, supra note 6, at 775 (“Access to counsel creates an easy and natural mecha-
nism to guarantee rational, self-interested waiver decisions by ensuring that defendants
waive their rights only after consultation with a lawyer.”); see also Rosenthal, supra note 4, at
954 (“Suspects may be foolish to think that interrogators will speak only the truth or dis-
close all material facts, but those who want unvarnished legal advice have a right to
counsel . . . .”).
332 496 U.S. 292, 294–95 (1991); see supra text accompanying notes 48–50.
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make the determination that it is in her best interests to remain silent, absent
any countervailing benefit of speaking.333
This also explains why, as even advocates of the status quo acknowl-
edge,334 it would be impermissible for a police officer to impersonate a law-
yer or member of the clergy.  It is not because of any sentimental notion that
such a tactic would “shock the conscience.”  It is for the very commonsense
reason that societal knowledge of the existence of the attorney-client and
clergy-communicant privileges is presumably widespread.335  When the sus-
pect believes she is speaking to someone with an obligation not to reveal
information, the risks of speaking are reduced to the vanishing point,
because an altogether different privilege prevents disclosure of the informa-
tion.  On the other hand, everyone knows or at least should know that there
is no “friend privilege” or even honor among thieves.  Thus, impersonation
of an attorney or member of the clergy by a police officer skews the perceived
relative benefits of speaking and remaining silent in a way that impersonating
a mere friend or associate does not.336  Whether one’s conscience is shocked
is entirely beside the point.
CONCLUSION
The law on coerced confessions is notoriously messy, with its totality-of-
the-circumstances test by which no factor is dispositive but all are relevant.
There is no need to complicate matters further by adding deception to the
mix.  Coercion and deception are simply different, and confusing the two is
entirely unhelpful.  Indeed, it can be downright dangerous, as where courts
conclude that because true promises of leniency are not coercive per se, false
promises of leniency are fair game.  Courts should disaggregate coercion and
deception, subjecting the former to the traditional due process test and treat-
ing the latter as potentially vitiating a suspect’s waiver of her right to silence
based on the materiality test proposed above.
That test not only helps explain much of current law but also reflects our
understanding of deception in other contexts across the legal spectrum, and
of the Court’s evolving jurisprudence on Miranda.  And it is easier to apply
than mixing deception into the totality-of-the-circumstances batter.  Pursuant
to that test, employment of the false sympathy, false evidence, fabricated evi-
333 It is thus inaccurate to say that “the trickery of the ‘jail plant’ ploy affords the sus-
pect no opportunity to apply his powers of resistance because the peril of speaking is hid-
den from him.”  White, Police Trickery, supra note 6, at 606.  Unless one is speaking to
someone with a legal obligation not to disclose the contents of the conversation, there is
always a peril to speaking.
334 See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
335 Cf. GRANO, supra note 249, at 110 (“If police cannot require lawyers and members of
the clergy to disclose confessions, they should not be able to obtain confessions directly
from defendants by exploiting such relationships of trust.”).
336 Cf. id. at 112 (“Nothing in our tradition would equate the suspect-acquaintance
relationship, or the prisoner-cellmate relationship, to relationships that individuals have
with lawyers, doctors, and members of the clergy.”).
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dence, and minimization ploys is permissible, while distortion or contradic-
tion of the Miranda warnings and false promises of leniency in exchange for
a confession are off limits.  Of course, litigation will arise over deception
relating to extrinsic matters, and close cases over how to interpret and cate-
gorize the deception at hand are inevitable.  But a test grounded in material-
ity provides a sturdy guidepost for courts to follow.
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